His full sickening speech so you cant say anything was taken out of context
Using vaccines to kill people and depopulate the planet
This scum bag cant stop smiling after he suggest killing Nana
And for all the idiots who say there are to many people, there killing you too! Do you really think they want half educated westerners who are catching on to whats going on alive or the African and Chinese slave class alive to be servants?
You absolutely must check out this program. This is a sneak peak of what is to come. The courageous & lovely ladies that created this radio show are both VIP members of this of first of November, April Boden and Virstyne Henry. I'm quite excited to listen to the coming shows. Its easy to complain about things but to actually do something of this magnitude is awesome! So please tune in and show them the support they deserve, and please share. I will endeavour to post all episodes on this page also. Thank you
Virstyne and April interview each other, recalling their own personal awakenings. They discuss the meaning of truth to them in effort to encourage others to share and explore their own. They discuss the ways in which they have personally been effected by the grand depopulation agenda and how that has impacted their health or the health of loved ones. They also go over some ways they've managed to combat this by fighting the powers that be, staying positive and seeking natural health solutions.
Please watch, enjoy and comment.
Peace, truth and love. http://www.blogtalkradio.com/truthertalk/2012/06/04/truther-talk-episode-1-awakenings
Sure Facebook is convenient ,its great to catch up and keep in contact with friends and family on but at what cost?
Mark
Zuckerberg calls users dumb fucks and maybe his right ,anyone who is tuned in to any sort of privacy is constantly amazed by the amount that facebook abuses their users .
Not only is Facebook the biggest social media site, its also the largest and broadest and longest reaching data mining organisation in the world ,how did he do it ? Well he asked for it,and being naive enough and feeling safe enough behind your computer you coffed up more information then he could possibly know what to to with.But don't worry his trying to sell it all.
From your interests to your likes ,to your friends to your family and your relationships , to your sexual preference, to your politics ,your age, your place of work, your location previous locations, not to mention photos of you and friends ....the list could go on and on.
Imagine your now a police officer ,ohh the glory you wouldn't have anything but ring facebook and ask for a complete profile record and they send you one .And they don't just get a break down they get everything thing ,photos with everyone tagged in them ,all the profiles you visit ever and the amount of times you have visited them.All your friend and all there details the places you go and who you go there with . http://news.ninemsn.com.au/technology/8448946/facebooks-disturbing-treasure-trove-of-data
They now are using facial recognition in every photo that is put on facebook to find out who everybody is ,if you have ever been tagged in a photo your now tagged in all of them .
And just when you change all your privacy setting the facebook changes the term and conditions and the style of the page so your a little lost and have to redo your setting for all the new scams "services'' they re running .
Never mind the fact that governments kills more of their own population then anyone else.
But don't worry , you got nothing to hide .But who's watching and why ?
The Century of the Self is an award winning British television documentary. It focuses on how Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, and Edward Bernays influenced the way corporations and governments have analysed, dealt with, and controlled people.
Unless you watch this series you will never truly understand yourself and why you do certain things and the forces that urge you to do them.
PART 1 Happiness machines
PART 2The engineering of consent.
PART 3 There is a policemen inside all our heads and he must be destroyed
Ever heard a politician dribble 2 minute of shit after a question ,and your like what the fuck was that!?That my friend was spin .Purposely using a line out of the question and then completely moving in a different direction ,this doco is a great at showing the spin king giving advice to politicians ,and behind the scenes in tv studios.Great watch.
George Carlin The American Dream ,Because you have to be alseep to believe it.
The Greatest Scam on Earth - The Money Scam! The Money Scam is hidden right out in the open, yet buried in complication and confusion. A retired banker describes simply, the world's Money Scam and the reason every country is now going bankrupt. Private bankers have stolen the money creation process, and whereas once our money was created by the governments, debt-free, it is now created out of thin air and issued as debt with interest charges. In today's banker controlled world, money = debt, debt = slavery and therefore money = slavery --- our monetary systems have become systems of enslavement. Money is created out of nothing, issued as debt, not enough money is created for the future interest payments and inflation steals our savings. The money creation process should be taken away from the banks and given to the governments who can create money debt-free, interest-free. This is how it used to be done and we needed no income taxes. Finally, it is explained what we should do to stop supporting the money scam.
Dave Mustaine of Megadeath and Metallica ,ranked Number 1 in Joel mclver's 100 best rock and roll guitarists,speaks on life ,rock and roll and himself.
Clive Palmer the fifth riches man in Australia has exploded today slamming the Greens as being part of a conspiracy to slow and destroy the coal industry in Australia .
Clive goes on to say that the green movement in Australia is getting money 'proberbly''from the CIA and Lanley and definitely from the Rockefella foundation.Considering the very deep and beyond life time ties with the CIA the Rochefella s even ran the over site of the CIA called the Rockefella commission.''President Ford heads off calls from Democrats to investigate the program by appointing the “Rockefeller Commission” to investigate in the Democrats’ stead. Senate Democrats, unimpressed with the idea, create the Church Committee to investigate the intelligence community (see April, 1976). Rockefeller is adept at keeping critical documents out of the hands of the Church Committee and the press. When Senator Frank Church asks for materials from the White House, he is told that the Rockefeller Commission has them; when he asks Rockefeller for the papers, he is told that he cannot have them because only the president can authorise access'' that a grab out of this Article .http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=_rockefeller_commission__1
In the two video clips above he mentions the report ''Stopping the Australian coal export boom''which i cant find yet because it only got leaked 2 days ago but i did find the second report the ''church report '' which for my own benefit i will post now in here in full.This is part of the Stopping the Australian coal export boom '' document that i found
copy and zoom to see this important pic
THE CHURCH REPORT pay attention to number 23
Below is the
executive summary of the Church Committee Report. This is partly a primary
source, partly a good piece of investigative reporting on US actions in Chile.
Read it not only for what it says but for what it says about its authors'
ideological assumptions.
The Church Committee
Report
94th Congress 1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT
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COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 1963-1973
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STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
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UNITED STATES SENATE
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Printed for the use of the Select Committee To
Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities
--------------------------------------------------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE Washington: 1975
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington, D.C., 20402 - Price 80 cents
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
FRANCK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman
PHILIP, A. HART, Michigan HOWARD H. BAKER,Jr., Tennessee
WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES McC. MATTHIAS,Jr., Maryland
ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina RICHARD SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania
GARY HART, Colorado
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ,Jr., Chief Counsel
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, Counsel to the Minority
AUDREY HATRY, Clerk of the Committee
(II)
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PREFACE
The statements of facts contained in this report are true to the
best of the Committee staff's ability to determine them. The
report and any judgment expressed in it are tentative. Several
areas are merely touched on; investigation in these areas is
continuing. The purpose of the report is to lay out the basis facts
of covert action in Chile to enable the Committee to hold public
hearings.
This report is based on an extensive review of documents of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State and Defense,
and the National Security Council; and on testimony by officials
and former officials. With few exceptions, names of Chileans and of
Chilean institutions have been omitted in order to avoid revealing
intelligence sources and methods and to limit needless harm to
individual Chileans who cooperated with the Central Intelligence
Agency. The report does, however, convey an accurate picture of
the scope, purposes and magnitude of United States covert action
in Chile.
(III)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. Overview and Background 1
A. Overview: Covert Action in Chile 1
B. Issues 3
C. Historical Background in Recent United States-Chilean
Relations 3
II. The Range of Covert Action in Chile 6
A. Covert Action and Other Clandestine Activities 6
B. Covert Action in Chile: Techniques 7
C. Covert Action and Multinational Corporations 11
III. Major Covert Action Programs and Their Effects 14
A. The 1964 Presidential Election 14
B. Covert Action: 1964-1969 17
C. The 1970 Election: A "Spoiling" Campaign 19
D. Covert Action Between September 4 and October 24, 1970 23
E. Covert Action During the Allende Years, 1970-1973 26
F. Post-1973 39
IV. Chile: Authorization, Assessment, and Oversight 41
A. 40 Committee Authorization and Control: Chile 1969-1973 41
B. Intelligence Estimates and Covert Action 43
C. Congressional Oversight 49
V. Preliminary Conclusions 51
A. Covert Action and U.S. Foreign Policy 51
B. Executive Command and Control of Major Covert Action 52
C. The role of Congress 53
D. Intelligence Judgments and Cover Operations 54
E. Major Covert Action Programs 54
Appendix. Chronology: Chile 1962-1975 52
(V)
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When senior officials in Washington
perceived special dangers, or opportunities, in Chile, special CIA projects were
developed, often as part of a larger package of U.S. actions. For instance, the
CIA spent over three million dollars in an election program in 1964.
Half a decade later, in 1970, the CIA engaged in another special effort, this
time at the express request of President Nixon and under the injunction not to
inform the Departments of State or Defense or the Ambassador of the project. Nor
was the 40 Committee2 ever informed. The CIA attempted, directly, to foment a
military coup in Chile. It passed three weapons to a group of Chilean officers
who plotted a coup. Beginning with the kidnapping of Chilean Army
Commander-in-Chief Rene Schneider. However, those guns were returned. The group
which staged the abortive kidnap of Schneider, which resulted in his death,
apparently was not the same as the group which received CIA weapons.3
When the coup attempt failed and Allende was inaugurated President, the CIA
was authorized by the 40 Committee to fund groups in opposition to Allende in
Chile. The effort was massive. Eight million dollars was spent in the three
years between the 1970 election and the military coup in September 1973. Money
was furnished to media organizations, to opposition political parties and, in
limited amounts, to private sector organizations.
Numerous allegations have been made about U.S. covert activities in Chile
during 1970-73. Several of these are false; others are half true. In most
instances, the response to the allegations must be qualified:
Was the United States DIRECTLY involved, covertly, in the 1973 coup in Chile?
The Committee has found no evidence that it was. However, the United States
sought in 1970 to foment a military coup in Chile; after 1970 it adopted a
policy both overt and covert, of opposition to Allende; and it remained in
intelligence contact with the Chilean military, including officers who were
participating in coup plotting.
Did the U.S. provide covert support to striking truck-owners or other
strikers during 1971-73? The 40 Committee did not approve any such support.
However, the U.S. passed money to private sector groups which supported the
strikers. And in at least one case, a small amount of CIA money was passed to
the strikers by a private sector organization, contrary to CIA ground rules. Did
the U.S. provide covert support to right-wing terrorist organizations during
1970-73?
The CIA gave support in 1970 to one group whose tactics became more violent
over time. Through 1971 that group received small sums of American money through
third parties for specific purpose. And it is possible that money was passed to
these groups on the extreme right from CIA-supported opposition political
parties.
The pattern of United States covert action in Chile is striking but not
unique. It arose in the context not only of American foreign policy, but also of
covert U.S. involvement in other countries within and outside Latin America. The
scale of CIA involvement in Chile was unusual but by no means unprecedented.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 The 40 Committee is a sub-Cabinet level body of the Executive Branch whose
mandate is to review proposed major covert actions. The Committee has existed in
similar form since the 1950's under a variety of names: 5412 Panel, Special
Group (until 1964), 303 Committee (to 1969), and 40 Committee (since 1969).
Currently chaired by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs,
the Committee includes the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, The
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Director of Central Intelligence.
3 This matter is discussed extensively in the Committee's interim report
entitled, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, 94 Cong., 1
sess. (November 1975), pp. 225-254.
(2)
B.Issues
The Chilean case raises most of the issues connected with covert action as an
instrument of American foreign policy. It consisted of long, frequently heavy
involvement in Chilean politics: it involved the gamut of covert action methods,
save only covert military operations; and it revealed a variety of different
authorization procedures, with different implications for oversight and control.
As one case of U.S. covert action, the judgments of past actions are framed not
for their own sake; rather they are intended to serve as bases for formulating
recommendations for the future.
The basic questions are easily stated:
(1) Why did the United States mount such an extensive covert action program
in Chile? Why was that program continued and then expanded in the early 1970's?
(2) How was this major covert action program authorized and directed? What
roles were played by the President, the 40 Committee, the CIA, the Ambassadors
and the Congress?
(3) Did U.S. policy-makers take into account the judgments of the
intelligence analysts on Chile when they formulated and approved U.S. covert
operations? Does the Chilean experience illustrate an inherent conflict between
the role of the Director of Central Intelligence as a producer of intelligence
and his role a manager of covert operations?
(4) Did the perceived threat in Chile justify the level of U.S. response?
What was the effect of such large concentrated programs of covert political
action in Chile? What were the effects, both abroad and at home, of the
relationships which developed between the intelligence agencies and American
based multinational corporations?
C. Historical Background to Recent United States-Chilean Relations
1. Chilean Politics and Society: an Overview
Chile has historically attracted far more interest in Latin America and, more
recently, throughout the world, than its remote geographic position and scant
eleven-million population would at first suggest.
Chile's history has been one of remarkable continuity in civilian, democratic
rule. From independence in 1818 until the military coup d'etat of September
1973, Chile underwent only three brief interruptions of its democratic
tradition. From 1932 until the overthrow of Allende in 1973, constitutional rule
in Chile was unbroken.
Chile defies simplistic North American stereotypes of Latin America. With
more than two-thirds of its population living in cities, and a 1970 per capita
GNP of $760, Chile is one of the most urbanized and industrialized countries in
Latin America. Nearly all of the Chilean population is literate. Chile has an
advanced social welfare program, although its activities did not reach the
majority of the poor until popular participation began to be exerted in the
early 1960's. Chileans are a largely integrated mixture of indigenous American
with European immigrant stock. Until September 1973, Chileans brokered their
demands in a bicameral parliament through a multi-party system and through a
broad array of economic, trade union, and, more recently, managerial and
professional associations.
(3)
2. U.S. Policy Toward Chile
The history of United States policy toward Chile followed the patterns of
United States diplomatic and economic interests in the hemisphere. In the same
year that the United States recognized Chilean independence, 1823, it also
proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine. This unilateral policy pronouncement of the
United States was directed as a warning toward rival European powers not to
interfere in the internal political affairs of this hemisphere.
The U. S. reaction to Fidel Castro's rise to power suggested that while the
Monroe Doctrine had been abandoned, the principles which prompted it were still
alive. Castro's presence spurred a new United States hemispheric policy with
special significance for Chile - the Alliance for Progress. There was little
disagreement among policymakers either at the end of the Eisenhower
Administration or at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration that something
had to be done about the alarming threat that Castro was seen to represent to
the stability of the hemisphere.
The U.S. reaction to the new hemispheric danger - communist revolution -
evolved into a dual policy response. Widespread malnutrition, illiteracy,
hopeless housing conditions and hunger for the vast majority of Latin Americans
who were poor; these were seen as communism's allies. Consequently, the U.S.
undertook loans to national development programs and supported civilian
reformist regimes, all with an eye to preventing the appearance of another Fidel
Castro in our hemisphere.
But there was another component in U.S. policy toward Latin America.
Counterinsurgency techniques were developed to combat urban or rural guerrilla
insurgencies often encouraged or supported by Castro's regime. Development could
not cure overnight the social ills which were seen as the breeding ground of
communism. New loans for Latin American countries' internal national development
programs would take time to bear fruit. In the meantime, the communist threat
would continue. The vicious circle plaguing the logic of the Alliance for
Progress soon became apparent. In order to eliminate the short-term danger of
communist subversion, it was often seen as necessary to support Latin American
armed forces, yet frequently it was those same armed forces who were helping to
freeze the status quo which the Alliance sought to alter.
Of all the countries in the hemisphere, Chile was chosen to become the
showcase for the new Alliance for Progress. Chile had the extensive bureaucratic
infrastructure to plan and administer a national development program; moreover,
its history of popular support for Socialist, Communist and other leftist
parties was perceived in Washington as flirtation with communism. In the years
between 1962 and 1969, Chile received well over a billion dollars in direct,
overt United States aid, loans and grants both included. Chile received more aid
per capita than any country in the hemisphere. Between 1964 and 1970, $200 to
$300 million in short-term lines of credit was continuously available to Chile
from private American banks.
3. Chilean Political Parties: 1958-1970
The 1970 elections marked the fourth time Salvador Allende had been
presidential candidate of the Chilean left. His personality and
(4)
his program were familiar to Chilean voters. His platform was similar in all
three elections: efforts to redistribute income and reshape the Chilean economy,
beginning with the nationalization of major industries, especially the copper
companies; greatly expand agrarian reform; and expanded relations with socialist
and communist countries.
Allende was one of four candidates in the 1958 elections. His principal
opponents were Jorge Alessandri, a conservative, and Eduardo Frei, the candidate
of the newly formed Christian Democratic Party, which contended against the
traditionally centrist Radical Party. Allende's coalition was an uneasy
alliance, composed principally of the Socialist and Communist Parties, labeled
the Popular Action Front (FRAP). Allende himself, a self-avowed Marxist, was
considered a moderate within his Socialist Party, which ranged from the extreme
left to moderate social democrats. The Socialists, however, were more militant
than the pro- Soviet, bureaucratic -though highly organized and disciplined-
Communist Party.
Allende finished second to Alessandri in the 1958 election by less than three
percent of the vote. Neither candidate received a majority, and the Chilean
Congress voted Alessandri into office. If Allende had received the votes which
went to a leftist priest -who received 3.3 percent of the votes- he would have
won the election.
The Alessandri government lost popularity during its tenure. Dissatisfaction
with it was registered in the 1961 congressional and 1963 municipal elections.
The FRAP parties made significant gains, and the Christian Democratic Party
steadily increased its share of the electorate until, in the 1963 elections, it
became the largest single party.
The 1964 election shaped up as a three-way race. Frei was once again the
Christian Democratic candidate, and the parties of the left one again selected
Allende as their standard-bearer. The governing coalition, the Democratic Front,
chose Radical Julio Duran as their candidate. Due in part to an adverse election
result in a March 1964 by-election in a previously conservative province, the
Democratic Front collapsed. The Conservative and Liberals, reacting to the
prospect of an Allende victory, threw their support to Frei, leaving Duran as
the standard- bearer of only the Radical Party.
After Frei's decisive majority victory, in which he received 57 percent of
the vote, he began to implement what he called a "revolution in liberty". That
included agrarian, tax, and housing reform. To deal with the American copper
companies, Frei proposed "Chileanization", by which the state would purchase
majority ownership in order to exercise control and stimulate output.
Frei's reforms, while impressive, fell far short of what he had promised.
Lacking a majority in Congress, he was caught between the FRAP parties, which
demanded extreme measures, and the rightists, who withheld support from Frei in
order to force a compromise on the agrarian reform issue. Like its predecessor,
the Frei government lost popularity during its tenure; the Christian Democrats'
portion of the vote in congressional elections fell from 43 percent in 1965 to
31 percent in 1969. During the Frei years the internal strains of the Party
became more evident, culminating in the 1968 defection of the Party's left-wing
elements.
Frei's relations with the United States were cordial, although he pursued an
independent foreign policy. His government established diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union immediately after taking power and in 1969 reestablished trade
relations with Cuba.
(5)
II. THE RANGE OF COVERT ACTION IN CHILE
A. Covert Action and Other Clandestine Activities
This study is primarily concerned with what is labeled "covert action" by the
United States government. Covert action projects are considered a distinct
category and are authorized and managed accordingly. But it is important to bear
in mind what the category excludes as well as what it includes. The Committee's
purpose is to evaluate the intent and effect of clandestine American activities
in Chile. Some secret activities by the United States not labeled "covert
action" may have important political impacts and should be considered.
The CIA conducts several kinds of clandestine activity in foreign countries:
clandestine collection of positive foreign intelligence: counterintelligence (or
liaison with local services); and covert action. Those different activities are
handled somewhat differently in Washington; they are usually the responsibility
of different CIA officers in the field. Yet all three kinds of projects may have
effects on foreign politics. All three rely on the establishment of clandestine
relationships with foreign nationals.
In the clandestine collection of intelligence, the purpose of the
relationship is the gathering of information. A CIA officer establishes a
relationship with a foreign "asset" -paid or unpaid- in a party or government
institution in order to find out what is going on inside that party or
institution. There is typically no attempt made by the CIA officer to influence
the actions of the "asset". Yet even that kind of covert relationship may have
political significance. Witness the maintenance of CIA's and military attaches'
contacts with the Chilean military after the inauguration of Salvador Allende:
although the purpose was information-gathering, the United States maintained
links to the group most likely to overthrow the new president. To do so was to
walk a tightrope; the distinction between collecting information and exercising
influence was inherently hard to maintain. Since the Chilean military perceived
its actions to be contingent to some degree on the attitude of the U.S.
government, those possibilities for exercising influence scarcely would have had
to be consciously manipulated.
Liaison relationships with local police or intelligence services pose a
similar issue. The CIA established such relationships in Chile with the primary
purpose of securing assistance in gathering intelligence on external targets.
But the link also provided the Station with information on internal subversives
and opposition elements within Chile. That raised the difficulty of ensuring
that American officials did not stray into influencing the actions of Chileans
with whom they were in contact. And it meant that the CIA was identified, to
some degree, with the internal activities of Chilean police and intelligence
services,
(6)
whether or not the U.S. government supported those actions. That became a
matter for great concern in 1973 with the advent of the Pinochet regime.
The purpose of this case study is to describe and assess the range of covert
U.S. activities which influenced the course of political events in Chile. Most
of the discussion which follows is limited to activities labeled and run as
"covert action" projects. That category is itself broad. But it excludes other
clandestine activities with possible political effects.
B. Covert Action in Chile: Techniques
Even if the set of activities labeled "covert action" does not include all
clandestine American efforts with possible political effects, that set is
nonetheless broad. U.S. covert action in Chile encompassed a range of techniques
and affected a wide variety of Chilean institutions. It included projects which
were regarded as the framework necessary for covert operations, as well as major
efforts called forth by special circumstances. The following paragraphs will
give a flavor of that range.
1. Propaganda
The most extensive covert action activity in Chile was propaganda. It was
relatively cheap. In Chile, it continued at a low level during "normal" times,
then was cranked up to meet particular threats or to counter particular dangers.
The most common form of a propaganda project is simply the development of
"assets" in media organizations who can place articles or be asked to write
them. The Agency provided to its field Station several kinds of guidance about
what sorts of propaganda were desired. For example, one CIA project in Chile
supported from one to five media assets during the seven years it operated
(1965-1971). Most of those assets worked for a major Santiago daily which was
the key to CIA propaganda efforts. Those assets wrote articles or editorials
favorable to U.S. interests in the world (for example, criticizing the Soviet
Union in the wake of the Czechoslovakian invasion); suppressed news items
harmful to the United States (for instance about Vietnam); and authored articles
critical of Chilean leftists.
The covert propaganda efforts in Chile also included "black" propaganda
-material falsely purporting to be the product of a particular individual or
group. In the 1970 election, for instance, the CIA used "black" propaganda to
sow discord between the Communists and the Socialists and between the national
labor confederation and the Chilean Communist Party.
TABLE I -Techniques of Covert Action -Expenditures in Chile,
1963-73 1.
Techniques
Amount Propaganda for elections and other support for political
parties $8,000,000 Producing and
disseminating propaganda and supporting mass media
4,300,000 Influencing Chilean institutions (labor,
students, peasants, women) and supporting private sector
organizations
900,000 Promoting military coup
d'etat
< 200,000
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1. Figures rounded to nearest $100,000
(7)
In some cases, the form of propaganda was still more direct. The Station
financed Chilean groups who erected wall posters, passed out political pamphlets
(at times prepared by the Station) and engaged in other street activities. Most
often these activities formed part of larger projects intended to influence the
outcomes of Chilean elections (see below), but in at least one instance the
activities took place in the absence of an election campaign.
Of thirty-odd covert action projects undertaken by Chile by the CIA between
1961 and 1974, approximately a half dozen had propaganda as their principal
activity. Propaganda was an important subsidiary element of many others,
particularly election projects. (See TABLE I). Press placements were attractive
because each placement might produce a multiplier effect, being picked up and
replayed by media outlets other than the one in which it originally came out.
2. Support for Media
In addition to buying propaganda piecemeal, the Station often purchased it
wholesale by subsidizing Chilean media organizations friendly to the United
States. Doing so was propaganda writ large. Instead of placing individual items,
the CIA supported -or even founded- friendly media outlets which might not have
existed in the absence of Agency support.
From 1953 through 1970 in Chile, the Station subsidized wire services,
magazines written for intellectual circles, and a right-wing weekly newspaper.
According to the testimony of former officials, support for the newspaper was
terminated because it became so inflexibly rightist as to alienate responsible
conservatives.
By far, the largest -and probably the most significant- instance of support
for a media organization was the money provided to EL MERCURIO, the major
Santiago daily, under pressure during the Allende regime. The support grew out
of an existing propaganda project. In 1971 the Station judged that EL MERCURIO,
the most important opposition publication, could not survive pressure from the
Allende government, including intervention in the newsprint market and the
withdrawal of government advertising. The 40 Committee authorized $700,000 for
EL MERCURIO on September 9, 1971, and added another $965,000 to that
authorization on April 11, 1972. A CIA project renewal memorandum concluded that
EL MERCURIO and other media outlets supported by the Agency had played an
important role in setting the stage for the September 11, 1973, military coup
which overthrew Allende.
3. Gaining Influence in Chilean Institutions and Groups.
Through its covert activities in Chile, the U.S. government sought to
influence the actions of a wide variety of institutions and groups in Chilean
society. The specific intent of those activities ran the gamut from attempting
to influence directly the making of government policy to trying to counter
communist or leftist influence among organized groups in the society. That most
of these projects included a propaganda component is obvious.
(8)
From 1964 through 1968, the CIA developed contacts within the Chilean
Socialist Party and at the Cabinet level of the Chilean government.
Projects aimed at organized groups in Chilean society had more diffuse
purposes than efforts aimed at government institutions. But the aim was similar:
influencing the direction of political events in Chile.
Projects were directed, for example, toward:
Wresting control of Chilean university student organizations from the
communists;
Supporting a women's group active in Chilean political and intellectual life;
Combating the communist-dominated CENTRAL UNICA DE TRABAJADORES CHILENOS
(CUTCH) and supporting democratic labor groups; and
Exploiting a civic action front group to combat communist influence within
cultural and intellectual circles.
4. Major Efforts to Influence Chilean Elections
Covert American activity was a factor in almost every major election in Chile
in the decade between 1963 and 1973. In several instances the United States
intervention was massive.
The 1964 presidential election was the most prominent example of a large-
scale election project. The Central Intelligence Agency spent more than $2.6
million in support of the election of the Christian Democratic candidate, in
part to prevent the accession to the presidency of Marxist Salvador Allende.
More than half of the Christian Democratic candidate's campaign was financed by
the United States, although he was not informed of this assistance. In addition,
the Station furnished support to an array of pro-Christian Democratic student,
women's, professional and peasant groups. Two other political parties were
funded as well in an attempt to spread the vote.
In Washington, an inter-agency election committee was established, composed
of State Department, White House and CIA officials. That committee was
paralleled by a group in the embassy in Santiago. No special task force was
established within the CIA, but the Station in Santiago was reinforced. The
Station assisted the Christian Democrats in running an American-style campaign,
which included polling, voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives, in
addition to covert propaganda.
The United States was also involved in the 1970 presidential campaign. That
effort, however, was smaller and did not include support for any specific
candidate. It was directed more at preventing Allende's election than at
insuring another candidate's victory.
Nor have U.S. involvement been limited to presidential campaigns. In the 1965
Chilean congressional elections, for instance, the Station was authorized by the
303 Committee to spend up to $175,000. Covert support was provided to a number
of candidates selected by the Ambassador and Station. A CIA election memorandum
suggested that the project did have some impact, including the elimination of a
number of FRAP (leftist coalition) candidates who might otherwise have won
congressional seats.
(9)
5. Support for Chilean Political Parties
Most covert American support to Chilean political parties was furnished as
part of specific efforts to influence election outcomes. However, in several
instances the CIA provided subsidies to parties for more general purposes, when
elections were not imminent. Most such support was furnished during the Allende
years, 1970-1973, when the U.S. government judged that without its support
parties of the center and right might not survive either as opposition elements
or as contestants in elections several years away.
In a sequence of decisions in 1971 through 1973, the 40 Committee authorized
nearly $4 million for opposition political parties in Chile. Most of this money
went to the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), but a substantial portion was
earmarked for the National Party (PN), a conservative grouping more stridently
opposed to the Allende government than was the PDC. An effort was also made to
split the ruling Popular Unity coalition by inducing elements to break away.
The funding of political parties on a large scale in 1970-73 was not,
however, without antecedents, albeit more modest in scale. In 1962 the Special
Group (predecessor to the 40 Committee) authorized several hundred thousand
dollars for an effort to build up the PDC in anticipation of the 1964 elections.
Small authorizations were made, in 1963 and 1967, for support to moderate
elements within the Radical Party.
6. Support for Private Sector Organizations
As part of its program of support for opposition elements during the Allende
government, the CIA provided money to several trade organizations of the Chilean
private sector. In September 1972, for instance, the 40 Committee authorized
$24,000 in emergency support for an anti-Allende businessmen's organization. At
that time, supporting other private sector organizations was considered but
rejected because of the fear that those organizations might be involved in
anti-government strikes.
The 40 Committee authorized $100,000 for private sector organizations in
October 1972, as part of the March 1973 election project. According to the CIA,
that money was spent only on election activities, such as voter registration
drives and get-out-the-vote drives. In August 1973, the Committee authorized
support for private sector groups, but with disbursement contingent on the
agreement of the Ambassador and State Department. That agreement was not
forthcoming.
7. Direct efforts to Promote a Military Coup
United States covert efforts to affect the course of Chilean politics reached
a peak in 1970: the CIA was directed to undertake an effort to promote a
military coup in Chile to prevent the accession to power of Salvador Allende.
That attempt, the so-called "Track II", is the subject of a separate Committee
report and will be discussed in section III below. A brief summary here will
demonstrate the extreme in American covert intervention in Chilean politics.
On September 15, 1970 -after Allende finished first in the election but
before the Chilean Congress had chosen between him and the
(10)
runner-up, Alessandri 1. -President Nixon met with Richard Helms, the
Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Attorney General John Mitchell. Helms was
directed to prevent Allende from taking power. This effort was to be conducted
without the knowledge of the Departments of State and Defense or the Ambassador.
Track II was never discussed at a 40 Committee meeting.
It quickly became apparent to both White House and CIA officials that a
military coup was the only way to prevent Allende's accession to power. To
achieve that end, the CIA established contact with several groups of military
plotters and eventually passed three weapons and tear gas to one group. The
weapons were subsequently returned, apparently unused. The CIA knew that the
plans of all groups of plotters began with the abduction of the
constitutionalist Chief of Staff of the Chilean Army, General Rene Schneider.
The Committee has received conflicting testimony about the extent of CIA/White
House communication and of White House officials' awareness of specific coup
plans, but there is no doubt that the U.S. government sought a military coup in
Chile.
On October 22, one group of plotters attempted to kidnap Schneider. Schneider
resisted, was shot, and subsequently died. The CIA had been in touch with that
group of plotters but a week earlier had withdrawn its support for the group's
specific plans.
The coup plotting collapsed and Allende was inaugurated President. After his
election, the CIA and U.S. military attaches maintained contacts with the
Chilean military for the purpose of collecting intelligence. Whether those
contacts strayed into encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende;
or whether the Chilean military -having been goaded toward a coup during Track
II- took encouragement to act against the President from those contacts even
though U.S. officials did not intend to provide it: these are major questions
which are inherent in U.S. covert activities in the period of the Allende
government.
C. Covert Action and Multinational Corporations
In addition to providing information and cover to the CIA, multinational
corporations also participated in covert attempts to influence Chilean politics.
The following is a brief description of the CIA's relationship with one such
corporation in Chile in the period 1963-1973 -International Telephone and
Telegraph, Inc. (ITT). Not only is ITT the most prominent and public example,
but a great deal of information has been developed on the CIA/ITT relationship.
This summary is based on new information provided to this Committee and on
material previously made public by the Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
1. 1964 Chilean Elections
During the 1964 presidential campaign, representatives of multinational
corporations approached the CIA with a proposal to provide
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1. Allende received 36.3 percent of the vote, Alessandri 34.9 percent,
Radomiro Tomic, the PDC candidate, finished third with 27.8 percent.
(11)
campaign funds to the Christian
Democratic Party. The CIA decision not to accept such funds, as well as other
CIA contacts with multinational corporations during that campaign, are fully
described in Part III.
2. 1970 Chilean Elections: Phase I
In 1970, the U.S. government and several multinational corporations were
linked in opposition to the candidacy and later the presidency of Salvador
Allende. This CIA-multinational corporation connection can be divided into two
phases. Phase I comprised actions taken by either the CIA or U.S.-based
multinational companies at a time when it was official U.S. policy not to
support, even covertly, any candidate or party in Chile. During this phase the
Agency was, however, authorized to engage in a covert "spoiling" operation
designed to defeat Salvador Allende. Phase II encompassed the relationship
between intelligence agencies and multinational corporations after the September
1970 general election. During Phase II, the U.S. government opposed Allende and
supported opposition elements. The government sought the cooperation of
multinational corporations in this effort.
A number of multinational corporations were apprehensive about the
possibility that Allende would be elected President of Chile. Allende's public
announcements indicated his intention, if elected, to nationalize basic
industries and to bring under Chilean ownership service industries such as the
national telephone company, which was at that time a subsidiary of ITT.
In 1964 Allende had been defeated, and it was widely known both in Chile and
among American multinational corporations with significant interests in Chile
that his opponents had been supported by the United States government. John
McCone, a former CIA Director and a member of ITT's Board of Directors in 1970,
knew of the significant American government involvement in 1964 and of the offer
of assistance made at that time by American companies. Agency documents indicate
that McCone informed Harold Geneen, ITT's Board Chairman, of these facts.
In 1970 leaders of American multinational corporations with substantial
interests in Chile, together with other American citizens concerned about what
might happen to Chile in the event of an Allende victory, contacted U.S.
government officials in order to make their views known.
In July 1970, a CIA representative in Santiago met with representatives of
ITT and, in a discussion of the upcoming election, indicated that Alessandri
could use financial assistance. The Station suggested the name of an individual
who could be used as a secure channel for getting these funds to the Alessandri
campaign.
Shortly thereafter John McCone telephoned CIA Director Richard Helms. As a
result of this call, a meeting was arranged between the Chairman of the Board of
ITT and the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA. Geneen offered
to make available to the CIA a substantial amount of money to be used in support
of the Alessandri campaign. In subsequent meetings ITT offered to make $1
million available to the CIA. The CIA rejected the offer. The memorandum
indicated further that CIA's advice was sought with respect to an individual who
might serve as a conduit of ITT funds to the Alessandri campaign.
(12)
The CIA confirmed that the
individual in question was a reliable channel which could be used for getting
funds to Alessandri. A second channel of funds from ITT to a political party
opposing Allende, the National Party, was developed following CIA advice as to a
secure funding mechanism utilizing two CIA assets in Chile. These assets were
also receiving Agency funds in connection with the "spoiling" operation.
During the period prior to the September election, ITT representatives met
frequently with CIA representatives both in Chile and in the United States and
CIA advised ITT as to ways in which it might safely channel funds both to the
Alessandri campaign and to the National Party. CIA was kept informed of the
extent and the mechanism of the funding. Eventually at least $350,000 was passed
by ITT to this campaign. A roughly equal amount was passed by other U.S.
companies; the CIA learned of this funding but did not assist in it.
3. Following the 1970 Chilean Elections: Phase II
Following the September 4 elections, the United States government adopted a
policy of economic pressure direct against Chile and in this connection sought
to enlist the influence of Geneen on other American businessmen. Specifically,
the State Department was directed by the 40 Committee to contact American
businesses having interests in Chile to see if they could be induced to take
actions in accord with the American government's policy of economic pressure on
Chile. On September 29, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA
met with a representative of ITT. The CIA official sought to have ITT involved
in a more active way in Chile. According to CIA documents, ITT took note of the
CIA presentation on economic warfare but did not actively respond to it.
One institution in Chile which was used in a general anti-Allende effort was
the newspaper chain EL MERCURIO. Both the United States government and ITT were
funneling money into the hands of individuals associated with the paper. That
funding continued after Allende was in office.
A great deal of testimony has been taken on the above matters, initially
before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. The degree of cooperation
between the CIA and ITT in the period prior to the September 1970 election
raises an important question: while the U.S. government was NOT supporting
particular candidates or parties, even covertly, was the CIA authorized to act
on its own in advising or assisting ITT in its covert financial support of the
Alessandri campaign?
(13)
III. Major Covert Action Programs and Their
Effects
This section outlines the major programs of covert action undertaken by the
United States in Chile, period by period. In every instance, covert action was
an instrument of United States foreign policy, decided upon at the highest
levels of the government. Each subsection to follow sets forth that policy
context. Without it, it is impossible to understand the covert actions which
were undertaken. After a discussion of policy, each subsection elaborates the
covert action tactics employed in each case. Finally, the effect of each major
program is assessed.
The section begins with the first major United States covert action in Chile
-the 1964 presidential elections.
A. THE 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
1. United States Policy
The United States was involved on a massive scale in the 1964 presidential
election in Chile. The Special Group authorized over three million dollars
during the 1962-64 period to prevent the election of a Socialist or Communist
candidate. A total of nearly four million dollars was spent on some fifteen
covert action projects, ranging from organizing slum dwellers to passing funds
to political parties.
The goal, broadly, was to prevent or minimize the influence of Chilean
Communists or Marxists in the government that would emerge from the 1964
election. Consequently, the U.S, sought the most effective way of opposing FRAP
(Popular Action Front), an alliance of Chilean Socialists, Communists, and
several miniscule non-Marxist parties of the left which backed the candidacy of
Salvador Allende. Specifically, the policy called for support of the Christian
Democratic Party, the Democratic Front (a coalition of rightist parties), and a
variety of anti-communist propaganda and organizing activities.
The groundwork for the election was laid early in 1961 by establishing
operational relationships with key political parties and by creating propaganda
and organizational mechanisms capable of influencing key sectors of the
population. Projects that had been conducted since the 1950's among peasants,
slum dwellers, organized labor, students and the media provided a basis for much
of the pre-election covert action.
The main problem facing the United States two years before the election was
the selection of a party and/or candidate to support against the leftist
alliance. The CIA presented two papers to the Special Group on April 2, 1962.
One of these papers proposed support for the Christian Democratic Party, while
the other recommended support of the Radical Party, a group to the right of the
Christian Democrats. The Special Group approved both proposals. Although
(14)
15
this strategy appears to have begun as an effort to hedge bets and support
two candidates for President, it evolved into a strategy designed to support the
Christian Democratic candidate.
On August 27, 1962, the Special Group approved the use of a third-country
funding channel and authorized $180,000 in fiscal year 1969 for the Chilean
Christian Democrats. The Kennedy Administration had preferred a center-right
government in Chile, consisting of the Radicals on the right and the Christian
Democrats in the center. However, political events in Chile in 1962-1969
-principally the creation of a right-wing alliance that included the Radical
Party- precluded such a coalition. Consequently, throughout 1963, the United
States funded both the Christian Democrats and the right-wing coalition, the
Democratic Front.
After a by-election defeat in May 1964 destroyed the Democratic Front, the
U.S. threw its support fully behind the Christian Democratic candidate. However,
CIA funds continued to subsidize the Radical Party candidate in order to enhance
the Christian Democrats' image as a moderate progressive party being attacked
from the right as well as the left.
2. Covert Action Techniques
Covert action during the 1964 campaign was composed of two major elements.
One was direct financial support of the Christian Democratic campaign. The CIA
underwrote slightly more than half of the total cost of that campaign. After
debate, the Special Group decided not to inform the Christian Democratic
candidate, Eduardo Frei, of American covert support of his campaign. A number of
intermediaries were therefore mobilized to pass the money to the Christian
Democrats.
In addition to the subsidies for the Christian Democratic Party, the Special
Group allocated funds to the Radical Party and to private citizens' groups. In
addition to support for political parties, the CIA mounted a massive
anti-communist propaganda campaign. Extensive use was made of the press, radio,
films, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, direct mailings, paper streamers, and wall
painting. It was a "scare campaign," which relied heavily on images of Soviet
tanks and Cuban firing squads and was directed especially to women. Hundreds of
thousands of copies of the anti-communist pastoral letter of Pope Pius XI were
distributed by Christian Democratic organizations. They carried the designation,
"printed privately by citizens without political affiliation, in order more
broadly to disseminate its content." "Disinformation" and "black propaganda"
-material which purported to originate from another source, such as the Chilean
Communist Party- were used as well.
The propaganda campaign was enormous. During the first week of intensive
propaganda activity (the third week of June 1964), a CIA-funded propaganda group
produced twenty radio spots per day in Santiago and on 44 provincial stations;
twelve-minute news broadcasts five time daily on three Santiago stations and 24
provincial outlets; thousands of cartoons, and much paid press advertising. By
the end of June, the group produced 24 daily newscasts in Santiago and the
provinces, 26 weekly "commentary" programs, and distributed 3,000
16
posters daily. The CIA regards the anti-communist scare campaign as the most
effective activity undertaken by the U.S. on behalf of the Christian Democratic
candidate.
The propaganda campaign was conducted internationally as well, and articles
from abroad were "replayed" in Chile. Chilean newspapers reported: an
endorsement of Frei by the sister of a Latin American leader, a public letter
from a former president in exile in the U.S., a "message from the women of
Venezuela." and dire warnings about an Allende victory from various figures in
military governments in Latin America.
The CIA ran political action operations independent of the Christian
Democrats' campaign in a number of important voter blocks, including slum
dwellers, peasants, organized labor and dissident Socialists. Support was given
to "anti-communist" members of the Radical Party in their efforts to achieve
positions of influence in the party hierarchy, and to prevent the party from
throwing its support behind Allende.
3. U.S. Government Organization for the 1964 Chilean Election
To manage the election effort, an electoral committee was established in
Washington, consisting of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, Thomas Mann; the Western Hemisphere Division Chief of the CIA, Desmond
Fitzgerald; Ralph Dungan and McGeorge Bundy from the White House; and the Chief
of the Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four, the branch that has jurisdiction
over Chile. This group was in close touch with the State Department Office of
Bolivian and Chilean Affairs. In Santiago there was a parallel Election
Committee that coordinated U.S. efforts. It included the Deputy Chief of
Mission, the CIA Chief of Station, and the heads of the Political and Economic
Sections, as well as the Ambassador. The Election Committee in Washington
coordinated lines to higher authority and to the field and other agencies. No
special task force was established. and the CIA Station in Santiago was
temporarily increased by only three officers.
4. Role of Multinational Corporations
A group of American businessmen in Chile offered to provide one and a half
million dollars to be administered and disbursed covertly by the U.S. Government
to prevent Allende from winning the 1964 presidential election. This offer went
to the 303 Committee (the name of the Special Group after June 1964) which
decided not to accept the offer. It decided that offers from American business
could not be accepted, that they were neither a secure way nor an honorable way
of doing business. This decision was a declaration of policy which set the
precedent for refusing to accept such collaboration between CIA and private
business. However, CIA money represented as private money, was passed to the
Christian Democrats through a private businessman.
5. Role of the Chilean Military On July 19, 1964, the Chilean Defense
Council, which is the equivalent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to
President Alessandri to propose a coup d'etat if Allende won. This offer
was transmitted to
17
the CIA Chief of Station, who told the Chilean Defense Council through an
intermediary that the United States was absolutely opposed to a coup. On July
20, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy was approached by a Chilean
Air Force general who threatened a coup if Allende won. The DCM reproached him
for proposing a coupd'etat and there was no further mention of
it. Earlier, the CIA learned that the Radical candidate for election, several
other Chileans, and an ex-politician from another Latin American country had met
on June 2 to organize a rightist group called the Legion of Liberty. They said
this group would stage a coup d'etat if Allende won, or if Frei won and
sought a coalition government with the Communist Party. Two of the Chileans at
the meeting reported that some military officers wanted to stage a coup
d'etat before the election if the United States Government would promise to
support it. Those approaches were rebuffed by the CIA.
6. Effects of Covert Action
A CIA study concludes that U.S. intervention enabled Eduardo Frei to win a
clear majority in the 1964 election, instead of merely a plurality. What U.S.
Government documents do not make clear is why it was necessary to assure a
majority, instead of accepting the victory a plurality would have assured. CIA
assistance enabled the Christian Democratic Party to establish an extensive
organization at the neighborhood and village level. That may have lent
grassroots support for reformist efforts that the Frei government undertook over
the next several years.
Some of the propaganda and polling mechanisms developed for use in 1964 were
used repeatedly thereafter, in local and congressional campaigns, during the
1970 presidential campaign, and throughout the 1970-1973 Allende presidency.
Allegations of CIA involvement in the campaign, and press allegations of CIA
funding of the International Development Foundation contributed to the U.S.
reluctance in 1970 to undertake another massive pre-election effort.
B. Covert Action: 1964-1969
During the years between the election of Christian Democratic President
Eduardo Frei in 1964 and the presidential election campaign of 1970 the CIA
conducted a variety of covert activities in Chile. Operating within different
sectors of society, these activities were all intended to strengthen groups
which supported President Frei and opposed Marxist influences.
The CIA spent a total of almost $2 million on covert action in Chile during
this period, of which one-fourth was covered by 40 Committee authorizations for
specific major political action efforts. The CIA conducted twenty covert action
projects in Chile during these years.
1. Covert Action Methods
In February 1965 the 303 Committee approved $175,000 for a short-term
political action project to provide covert support to selected candidates in the
March 1965 congressional elections in Chile. According to the CIA, twenty-two
candidates were selected by the Station and the Ambassador; nine were ejected.
The operation helped defeat up to 13 FRAP candidates who would otherwise have
won congressional seats.
Another election effort was authorized in July 1968, in preparation for the
March 1969 congressional election. The 40 Committee authorized $350,000 for this
effort, with the objective of strengthening moderate political forces before the
1970 presidential election. The program consisted of providing financial support
to candidates, supporting a splinter Socialist Party in order to attract votes
away from Allende's socialist party, propaganda activities, and assisting
independent groups. The CIA regarded the election effort as successful in
meeting its limited objective; ten of the twelve candidates selected for support
won their races, including one very unexpected victory. The support provided to
the dissident socialist group deprived the Socialist Party of a minimum of seven
congressional seats.
The 303 Committee also approved $30,000 in 1967 to strengthen the right wing
of the Radical Party.
A number of other political actions not requiring 303 Committee approval were
conducted. The project to increase the effectiveness and appeal of the Christian
Democratic Party and to subsidize the party during the 1964 elections continued
into late 1965 or 1966, as did a project to influence key members of the
Socialist Party toward orthodox European socialism and away from communism.
During this period, the CIA dealt with a Chilean official at the cabinet level,
though with scant result.
Covert action efforts were conducted during this period to influence the
political development of various sectors of Chilean society. One project,
conducted prior to the 1964 elections to strengthen Christian Democratic support
among peasants and slum dwellers, continued to help train and organize
"anti-communists" in these and other sectors until public exposure of CIA
funding in 1967 forced its termination. A project to compete organizationally
with the Marxists among the urban poor of Santiago was initiated shortly after
the 1964 election, and was terminated in mid-1969 because the principal agent
was unwilling to prejudice the independent posture of the organization by using
it on a large scale to deliver votes in the 1969 and 1970 presidential
elections. In the mid-1960's, the CIA supported an anti-communist women's group
active in Chilean political and intellectual life.
Two projects worked within organized labor in Chile. One, which began during
the 1964 election period, was a labor action project to combat the
communist-dominated Central Unica de Trabajadores Chilenos (CUTCh) and to
support democratic labor groups. Another project was conducted in the Catholic
labor field.
Various CIA projects during this period supported media efforts. One, begun
in the early 1950's, operated wire services. Another, which was an important
part of the 1964 election effort, supported anti-communist propaganda activities
through wall posters attributed to fictitious groups, leaflet campaigns, and
public heckling.
A third project supported a right-wing weekly newspaper, which was an
instrument of the anti-Allende campaign during and for a time after the 1970
election campaign. Another project funded an asset who produced regular radio
political commentary shows attacking
19
the political parties on the left and supporting CIA se1ected candidates.
After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, this asset organized a march on the
Soviet Embassy which led to major police action and mass media coverage. Other
assets funded under this project placed CIA-inspired editorials almost daily in
El Mercurio, Chile's major newspaper and, after 1968, exerted substantial
control over the content of that paper's international news section.
The CIA also maintained covert liaison relations with Chile's internal
security and intelligence services, civilian and military. The primary purpose
of these arrangements was to enable the Chilean services to assist CIA in
information collection about foreign targets. A subsidiary purpose of these
relationships was to collect information and meet the threat posed by communists
and other groups of the far left within Chile.
2. Effects Of Covert Action
The CIA's evaluations of the 1965 and 1969 election projects suggest that
those efforts were relatively successful in achieving their immediate goals. On
the other hand, the labor and "community development" projects were deemed
rather unsuccessful in countering the growth of strong leftist sentiment and
organization among workers, peasants and slum dwellers. For instance, neither of
the labor projects was able to find a nucleus of legitimate Chilean labor
leaders to compete effectively with the communist-dominated CUTCh.
The propaganda projects probably had a substantial cumulative effect over
these years, both in helping to polarize public opinion concerning the nature of
the threat posed by communists and other leftists, and in maintaining an
extensive propaganda capability. Propaganda mechanisms developed during the
1960's were ready to be used in the 1970 election campaign. At the same time,
however, in a country where nationalism, "economic independence" and
"anti-imperialism" claimed almost universal support, the persistent allegations
that the Christian Democrats and other parties of the center and right were
linked to the CIA may have played a part in undercutting popular support for
them.
C. THE 1970 ELECTION: A "SPOILING" CAMPAIGN 1. United States Policy and Covert Action
Early in 1969, President Nixon announced a new policy toward Latin America,
labeled by him "Action for Progress." It was to replace the Alliance for
Progress which the President characterized as paternalistic and unrealistic.
Instead, the United States was to seek "mature partnership" with Latin American
countries, emphasizing trade and not aid. The reformist trappings of the
Alliance were to be dropped; the United States announced itself prepared to deal
with foreign governments pragmatically.
The United States program of covert action in the 1970 Chilean elections
reflected this less activist stance. Nevertheless, that covert involvement was
substantial. In March 1970, the 40 Committee decided that the United States
should not support any single candidate in the election but should instead wage
"spoiling" operations against the Popular Unity coalition which supported the
'Marxist candidate,
20
Salvador Allende. In all, the CIA spent from $800,000 to $1,000,000 on covert
action to affect the outcome of the 1970 Presidential election. Of this amount
about half was for major efforts approved by the 40 Committee. By CIA estimates,
the Cubans provided about $350,000 to Allende's campaign, with the Soviets
adding an additional, undetermined amount. The large-scale propaganda campaign
which was undertaken by the U.S. was similar to that of 1964: an Allende victory
was equated with violence and repression.
2. Policy Decisions
Discussions within the United States Government about the 1970 elections
began in the wake of the March 1969 Chilean congressional elections. The CIA's
involvement in those elections was regarded by Washington as relatively
successful, even though the Christian Democrats' portion of the vote fell from
43 per cent in 1965 to 31 per cent in 1969. In June 1968 the 40 Committee had
authorized $350,000 for that effort, of which $200,000 actually was spent. Ten
of the twelve CIA-supported candidates were elected.
The 1970 election was discussed at a 40 Committee meeting on April 17, 1969.
It was suggested that something be done, and the CIA representative noted that
an election operation would not be effective unless it were started early. But
no action was taken at that time.
The 1970 Presidential race quickly turned into a three-way contest. The
conservative National Party, buoyed by the 1969 congressional election results,
supported 74-year-old, ex-President Jorge Alessandri. Radomiro Tomic became the
Christian Democratic nominee. Tomic, to the left of President Frei, was unhappy
about campaigning on the Frei government's record and at one point made
overtures to the Marxist left. Salvador Allende was once again the candidate of
the left, this time formed into a Popular Unity coalition which included both
Marxist and non-Marxist parties. Allende's platform included nationalization of
the copper mines, accelerated agrarian reform, socialization of major sectors of
the economy, wage increases, and improved relations with socialist and communist
countries.
In December 1969, the Embassy and Station in Santiago forwarded a proposal
for an anti-Allende campaign. That proposal, however, was withdrawn because of
the State Department's qualms about whether or not the United States should
become involved at all. The CIA felt it was not in a position to support Tomic
actively because ambassadorial "ground rules" of the previous few years had
prevented the CIA from dealing with the Christian Democrats. The Agency believed
that Alessandri, the apparent front runner, needed more than money; he needed
help in managing his campaign.
On March 25, 1970 the 40 Committee approved a joint Embassy/CIA proposal
recommending that "spoiling" operations -propaganda and other activities- be
undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent an election victory by Allende.
Direct support was not furnished to either of his opponents. This first
authorization was for $135,000, with the possibility of more later. On June 18,
1970, the Ambassador, Edward Korry, submitted a two-phase proposal to the
Department of State and the CIA for review. The first phase involved an increase
in support for the anti-Allende campaign. The second was a $500,000 contingency
plan to influence the
21
congressional vote in the event of a vote between the candidates finishing
first and second. In response to State Department reluctance, the Ambassador
responded by querying: if Allende were to gain power, how would the U.S. respond
to those who asked what actions it had taken to prevent it ?
On June 27, the 40 Committee approved the increase in funding for the
anti-Allende "spoiling" operation by $300,000. State Department officials at the
meeting voted "yes" only reluctantly. They spoke against the contingency plan,
and a decision on it was deferred pending the results of the September 4
election.
CIA officials met several times with officials from ITT during July. The CIA
turned down ITT's proposal to make funds available for CIA transmission to
Alessandri but did provide the company advice on how to pass money to
Alessandri. Some $350,000 of ITT money was passed to Alessandri during the
campaign -$250,000 to his campaign and $100,000 to the National Party. About
another $350,000 came from other U.S. businesses. According to CIA documents,
the Station Chief informed the Ambassador that the CIA was advising ITT in
funding the Alessandri campaign, but not that the Station was aiding ITT in
passing money to the National Party.
The 40 Committee met again on August 7 but did not give further consideration
to supporting either Alessandri or Tomic. As the anti-Allende campaign in Chile
intensified, senior policy makers turned to the issue of U.S. policy in the
event of an Allende victory. A study done in response to National Security Study
Memorandum 97 was approved by the Interdepartmental Group (IG) on August 18. The
approved paper1 set forth four options, one in the form of a covert
annex. The consensus of the Interdepartmental Group favored maintaining minimal
relations with Allende, but the Senior Review Group deferred decision until
after the elections. Similarly, a paper with alternatives was circulated to 40
Committee members on August 13, but no action resulted.
3. "Spoiling" Operations
The "spoiling" operations had two objectives: (I) undermining communist
efforts to bring about a coalition of leftist forces which could gain control of
the presidency in 1970; and (2) strengthening non-Marxist political leaders and
forces in Chile to order to develop an effective alternative to the Popular
Unity coalition in preparation for the 1970 presidential election.
In working toward these objectives, the CIA made use of half-a-dozen covert
action projects. Those projects were focused into an intensive propaganda
campaign which made use of virtually all media within Chile and which placed and
replayed items in the international press as well. Propaganda placements were
achieved through subsidizing right-wing women's and "civic action" groups. A
"scare campaign," using many of the same themes as the 1964 presidential
election program, equated an Allende victory with violence and Stalinist
repression. Unlike 1964, however, the 1970 operation did not involve extensive
public opinion polling, grass-roots organizing, or "community development"
efforts, nor, as mentioned, direct funding of any candidate.
-------------------------------------------------------
1 The minutes of the Interdepartmenta1 Group and Senior Review Group
deliberations have not as yet been provided to the Committee.
22
In addition to the massive propaganda campaign, the CIA's effort prior to the
election included political action aimed at splintering the non-Marxist Radical
Party and reducing the number of votes which it could deliver to the Popular
Unity coalition's candidate. Also, "black propaganda" -material purporting to be
the product of another group- was used in 1970 to sow dissent between Communists
and Socialists, and between the national labor confederation and the Chilean
Community Party.
The CIA's propaganda operation for the 1970 elections made use of mechanisms
that had been developed earlier. One mechanism had been used extensively by the
CIA during the March 1969 congressional elections. During the 1970 campaign it
produced hundreds of thousands of high-quality printed pieces, ranging from
posters and leaflets to picture books, and carried out an extensive propaganda
program through many radio and press outlets. Other propaganda mechanisms that
were in place prior to the 1970 campaign included an editorial support group
that provided political features, editorials, and news articles for radio and
press placement; a service for placing anti-communist press and radio items; and
three different news services.
There was a wide variety of propaganda products: a newsletter mailed to
approximately two thousand journalists, academicians, politicians, and other
opinion makers; a booklet showing what life would be like if Allende won the
presidential election; translation and distribution of chronicles of opposition
to the Soviet regime; poster distribution and sign-painting teams. The
sign-painting teams had instructions to paint the slogan "suparedon"
(your wall) on 2,000 walls, evoking an image of communist firing squads. The
"scare campaign" (campaña de terror) exploited the violence of the
invasion of Czechoslovakia with large photographs of Prague and of tanks in
downtown Santiago. Other posters resembling those used in 1964, portrayed Cuban
political prisoners before the firing squad, and warned that an Allende victory
would mean the end of religion and family life in Chile.
Still another project funded individual press assets. One, who produced
regular radio commentary shows on a nationwide hookup, had been CIA funded since
1965 and continued to wage propaganda for CIA during the Allende presidency.
Other assets, all employees of El Mercurio, enabled the Station to
generate more than one editorial per day based on CIA guidance. Access to El
Mercuric had a multiplier effect since its editorials were read throughout
the country on various national radio networks. Moreover, El Mercurio was
one of the most influential Latin American newspapers, particularly in business
circles abroad. A project which placed anti-communist press and radio items was
reported in 1970 to reach an audience of well over five million listeners.
The CIA funded only one political group during the 1970 campaign, in an
effort to reduce the number of Radical Party votes for Allende.
4. Effects
The covert action "spoiling" efforts by the United States during the 1970
campaign did not succeed: Allende won a plurality in the September 4 election.
Nevertheless, the "spoiling" campaign had several important effects.
23
First, the "scare campaign" contributed to the political polarization and
financial panic of the period. Themes developed during the campaign were
exploited even more intensely during the weeks following September 4, in an
effort to cause enough financial panic and political instability to goad
President Frei or the Chilean military into action.
Second, many of the assets involved in the anti-Allende campaign became so
visible that their usefulness was limited thereafter. Several of them left
Chile. When Allende took office, little was left of the CIA-funded propaganda
apparatus. Nevertheless, there remained a nucleus sufficient to permit a vocal
anti-Allende opposition to function effectively even before the new President
was inaugurated.
D. Covert Action Between September 4 and October 24
19702
On September 4, 1970, Allende won a plurality in Chile's presidential
election, Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular vote, the
Chilean Constitution required that a joint session of its Congress decide
between the first- and second-place finishers. The date set for the
congressional session was October 24, 1970.
The reaction in Washington to Allende's plurality victory was immediate. The
40 Committee met on September 8 and 14 to discuss what action should be taken
prior to the October 24 congressional vote. On September 15, President Nixon
informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be
acceptable to the United States and instructed the CIA to ploy a direct role in
organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession
to the Presidency.
Following the September 14 meeting of the 40 Committee and President Nixon's
September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government efforts to prevent Allende
from assuming office proceeded on two tracks.8 Track I comprised all
covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, including political, economic
and propaganda activities. These activities were designed to induce Allende's
opponents in Chile to prevent his assumption of power, either through political
or military means. Track II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to
President Nixon's September 15 order and were directed toward actively promoting
and encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende.
1. Track I A. POLITICAL ACTION
Initially both the 40 Committee and the CIA fastened on the so-called Frei
re-election gambit as a means of preventing Allende's assumption of office. This
gambit, which was considered a constitutional solution to the Allende problem,
consisted of inducing enough congressional votes to elect Alessandri over
Allende with the understanding that Alessandri would immediately resign, thus
paving the way for a special election in which Frei would legally become a
candidate. At the September 14 meeting of the 40 Committee, the Frei gum-
----------------------------------------------------------
2 This period, and particularly Track II, are dealt with in detail in an
interim Committee Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders, 94 Cong., 1st Sess. November 1975, pp.221-254.
3 The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House
officials who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order to the
CIA.
24
bit was discussed, and the Committee authorized a contingency fund of
$250,000 for covert support of projects which Frei or his associates deemed
important. The funds were to be handled by Ambassador Korry and used if it
appeared that they would be needed by the moderate faction of the Christian
Democratic Party to swing congressional votes to Alessandri. The only proposal
for the funds which was discussed was an attempt to bribe Chilean Congressmen to
vote for Alessandri. That quickly was seen to be unworkable, and the $250,000
was never spent.
CIA's Track I aimed at bringing about conditions in which the Frei gambit
could take place. To do this, the CIA, at the direction of the 40 Committee,
mobilized on interlocking political action, economic, and propaganda campaign.
As part of its political action program, the CIA attempted indirectly to induce
President Frei at least to consent to the gambit or, better yet assist in its
implementation. The Agency felt that pressures from those whose opinion and
views he valued -in combination with certain propaganda activities- represented
the only hope of converting Frei. In Europe and Latin America, influential
members of the Christian Democratic movement and the Catholic Church were
prompted either to visit or contact Frei. In spite of these efforts, Frei
refused to interfere with the constitutional process, and the re-election gambit
died.
B. PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN On September 14, the 40 Committee agreed that a propaganda campaign
should be undertaken by the CIA to focus on the damage that would befall Chile
under an Allende government. The campaign was to include support for the Frei
re-election gambit. According to a CIA memorandum, the campaign sought to create
concerns about Chile's future if Allende were elected by the Congress; the
propaganda was designed to influence Frei, the Chilean elite, and the Chilean
military.
The propaganda campaign included several components. Predictions of economic
collapse under Allende were replayed in CIA-generated articles in European and
Latin American newspapers. In response to criticisms of El Mercurio by
candidate Allende, the CIA, through its covert action resources, orchestrated
cables of support and protest from foreign newspapers, a protest statement from
an international press association, and world press coverage of the
association's protest. In addition, journalists -agents and otherwise- traveled
to Chile for on-the-scene reporting. By September 28, the CIA had agents who
were journalists from ten different countries in or en route to Chile. This
group was supplemented by eight more journalists from five countries under the
direction of high-level agents who were, for the most part, in managerial
capacities in the media field.
Second, the CIA relied upon its own resources to generate anti-Allende
propaganda in Chile. These efforts included: support for an underground press;
placement of individual news items through agents; financing a small newspaper;
indirect subsidy of Patria y Libertad a group fervently opposed to
Allende, and its radio programs, political advertisements and political rallies;
and the direct mailing of foreign news articles to Frei, his wife, selected
leaders, and the Chilean domestic press.
25
Third, special intelligence and "inside" briefings were given to U.S.
journalists, at their request. One Time cover story was considered
particularly noteworthy. According to CIA documents, the Time
correspondent in Chile apparently had accepted Allende's protestations of
moderation and constitutionality at face value. Briefings requested by Time
and provided by the CIA in Washington resulted in a change in the basic
thrust of the Time story on Allende's September 4 victory and in the
timing of that story.
A few statistics convey the magnitude of the CIA's propaganda campaign
mounted during the six-week interim period in the Latin American and European
media. According to the CIA, partial returns showed that 726 articles,
broadcasts, editorials, and similar items directly resulted from Agency
activity. The Agency had no way to measure the scope of the multiplier effect
-i.e., how much its "induced" news focused media interest on the Chilean issues
and stimulated additional coverage- but concluded that its contribution was both
substantial and significant.
C. ECONOMIC PRESSURES
On September 29, 1970, the 40 Committee met. It was agreed that the Frei
gambit had been overtaken by events and was dead. The "second-best option" -the
cabinet resigning and being replaced with a military cabinet- was also deemed
dead. The point was then made that there would probably be no military action
unless economic pressures could be brought to bear on Chile. It was agreed that
an attempt would be made to have American business take steps in line with the
U.S. government's desire for immediate economic action.
The economic offensive against Chile, undertaken as a part of Track I, was
intended to demonstrate the foreign economic reaction to Allende's accession to
power, as well as to preview the future consequences of his regime. Generally,
the 40 Committee approved cutting off all credits, pressuring firms to curtail
investment in Chile and approaching other nations to cooperate in this venture.
These actions of the 40 Committee, and the establishment of an interagency
working group to coordinate overt economic activities towards Chile (composed of
the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division Chief and representatives from State, the
NSC, and Treasury), adversely affected the Chilean economy; a major financial
panic ensued. However, U.S. efforts to generate an economic crisis did not have
the desired impact on the October 24 vote, nor did they stimulate a military
intervention to prevent Allende's accession.
2. Track II
As previously noted, U.S. efforts to prevent Allende's assumption of office
operated on two tracks between September 4 and October 24. Track II was
initiated by President Nixon on September 15 when he instructed the CIA to play
a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile. The Agency
was to take this action without coordination with the Departments of State or
Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador. While coup possibilities in
general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to power were
explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40 Committee
26
never discussed this direct CIA role. In practice, the Agency was to report,
both for informational and approval purposes, to the White House.
Between October 5 and October 20 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key
military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those Chileans who
were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the
highest levels of the U.S. Government both before and after a coup.
Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the month after September 15.
Ambassador Korry, who was formally excluded from Track II, was authorized to
encourage a military coup, provided Frei concurred in that solution. At the 40
Committee meeting on September 14, he and other "appropriate members of the
Embassy mission" were authorized to intensify their contacts with Chilean
military officers to assess their willingness to support the "Frei gambit." The
Ambassador was also authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military
aware that if Allende were seated, the military could expect no further military
assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, Korry was authorized to inform
the Chilean military that all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance
pending the outcome of the congressional election on October 24.
The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by
instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that Track II was
coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective in mind. There were
two differences between the two tracks: Track I was contingent on at least the
acquiescence of Frei; and the CIA's Track II direct contacts with the Chilean
military, and its active promotion and support for a coup, were to be known only
to a small group of individuals in the White House and the CIA.
Despite these efforts, Track II proved to be no more successful than Track I
in preventing Allende's assumption of office. Although certain elements within
the Chilean army were actively involved in coup plotting, the plans of the
dissident Chileans never got off the ground. A rather disorganized coup attempt
did begin on October 22, but aborted following the shooting of General
Schneider.
On October 24, 1970, Salvador Allende was confirmed as President by Chilean
Congress. On November 3, he was inaugurated. U.S. efforts, both overt and
covert, to prevent his assumption of office had failed.
E. COVERT ACTION DURING THE ALLENDE YEARS,
1970-1973 1. United States Policy and Covert Action
In his 1971 State of the World Message, released February 25, 1971, President
Nixon announced: "We are prepared to have the kind of relationship with the
Chilean government that it is prepared to have with us." This public
articulation of American policy followed internal discussions during the NSSM 97
exercise. Charles Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, elaborated that "correct but minimal" line in his 1973 testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations:
Mr. MEYER. The policy of the Government, Mr. Chairman, was that
there would be no intervention in the political affairs of Chile. We were
consistent in that we
27
financed no candidates, no political parties before or
September 8, or September 4... The policy of the United States was that Chile's
problem was a Chilean problem, to be settled by Chile. As the President stated
in October of 1969, "We will deal with governments as they are."
(Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety Third Congress Washington: GPO,
1973 Part 1, p. 402).
Yet public pronouncements not withstanding, after Allende's inauguration the
40 Committee approved a total of over seven million dollars in covert support
to opposition groups in Chile. That money also funded and extensive
anti-Allende propaganda campaign. Of the total authorized by the 40 Committee,
over six million dollars was spent during the Allende presidency and $84,000 was
expended shortly thereafter for commitments made before the coup. The total
amount spent on covert action in Chile during 1970-73 was approximately $7
million, including project funds not requiring 40 Committee approval.
Broadly speaking, U.S. policy sought to maximize pressures on the Allende
government to prevent its conso1idation and limit its ability to implement
policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests. That objective was stated
clearly in National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 93, issued in early
November1970. Other governments were encouraged to adopt similar policies, and
the U.S increased efforts to maintain close relations with friendly military
leaders in the hemisphere. The "cool but correct" overt posture denied the
Allende government a handy foreign enemy to use as a domestic and international
rallying point. At the same time, covert action was one reflection of the
concerns felt in Washington: the desire to frustrate Allende's experiment in the
Western Hemisphere and thus limit its attractiveness as a model; the fear that a
Chile under Allende might harbor subversives from other Latin American
countries; and the determination to sustain the principles of compensation for
U.S. firms nationalized by the Allende government.
Henry Kissinger outlined several of these concerns in a background briefing
to the press on September 16, 1970, in the wake of Allende's election plurality:
Now it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins,
there is a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort
of communist government. In that case you would have one not on an island off
the coast which has not a traditional relationship and impact on Latin America,
but in a major Latin American country you would have a Communist government,
joining, for example, Argentina, which is already deeply divided, along a long
frontier; joining Peru, which has already been heading in directions that have
been difficult to deal with, and joining Bolivia, which has also gone in a more
leftist, anti-U.S. direction, even without any of these developments. So I don't think we should delude ourselves that an Allende
takeover in Chile would not present massive problems for us, and for democratic
forces and for pro-U.S. forces in Latin America, and indeed to the whole Western
Hemisphere. What would happen to the Western Hemisphere Defense Board, or to the
Organization of America States, and so forth, in extremely problematical... It
is one of those situations which is not too happy for American interests (
Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, Washington: GPO, 1973,
Part2, pp. 542-3)
As the discussion of National Intelligence Estimate in Section IV of this
paper makes clear the more extreme fears about the effects of Allende's election
were ill-founded; there never was a significant
29
the opposition parties in three by-elections in 1972, and in the March 1973
congressional election. Money provided to political parties not only supported
opposition candidates in the various elections, but enabled the parties to
maintain an anti-government campaign throughout the Allende years, urging
citizens to demonstrate their opposition in a variety of ways.
Throughout the Allende years, the CIA worked to forge a united opposition.
The significance of this effort can be gauged by noting that the two main
elements opposing the Popular Unity government were the National Party, which
was conservative, and the reformist Christian Democratic Party, many of whose
members had supported the major policies of the new government.
B. PROPAGANDA AND SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION MEDIA
Besides funding political parties, the 40 Committee approved large amounts to
sustain opposition media and thus to maintain a hard-hitting propaganda
campaign. The CIA spent $1.5 million in support of El Mercurio, the
country's largest newspaper and the most important channel for anti-Allende
propaganda. According to CIA documents, these efforts played a significant role
in setting the stage for the military coup of September 11, 1973.
The 40 Committee approvals in 1971 and early 1972 for subsidizing El
Mercurio were based on reports that the Chi1ean government was trying to
close the El Mercurio chain. In fact, the press remained free throughout
the Allende period, despite attempts to harass and financially damage opposition
media. The alarming field reports on which the 40 Committee decisions were based
are at some variance with intelligence community analyses. For example, an
August 1971 National Intelligence Estimate -nine months after Allende took
power- maintained that the government was attempting to dominate the press but
commented that El Mercurio had managed to retain its independence. Yet
one month later the 40 Committee voted $700,000 to keep El Mercurio
afloat. And CIA documents in 1973 acknowledge that El Mercurio and,
to a 1esser extent, the papers belonging to opposition political parties, were
the only publications under pressure from the government.
The freedom of the press issue was the single most important theme in the
international propaganda campaign against Allende. Among the books and pamphlets
produced by the major opposition research organization was one which appeared in
October 1972 at the time of the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) meeting
in Santiago. As in the 1970 period, the IAPA listed Chile as a country in which
freedom of the press was threatened.
The CIA's major propaganda project funded a wide range of propaganda
activities. It produced several magazines with national circulations and a large
number of books and special studies. It developed material for placement in the
El Mercurio chain (amounting to a total daily circulation of over
300,000); opposition party newspapers; two weekly newspapers; all radio stations
controlled by opposition parties; and on several regular television shows on
three channels. El Mercurio was a major propaganda channel during
1970-73, as it had been during the l970 elections and pre-inauguration period.
30
The CIA also funded progressively a greater portion -over 75 percent in 1973-
of an opposition research organization. A steady flow of economic and technical
material went to opposition parties and private sector groups. Many of the bills
prepared by opposition parliamentarians were actually drafted by personnel of
the research organization.
C. SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS
The Committee has taken testimony that 40 Committee-approved funds were used
to help maintain and strengthen the democratic opposition in Chile. It has been
stressed that CIA had nothing to do with the truck owners' strike and the
disorders that led to the coup. The question of CIA support to Chilean private
sector groups is a matter of considerable concern because of the violent tactics
used by several of these groups in their efforts to bring about military
intervention.
The issue of whether to support private groups was debated within the Embassy
and the 40 Committee throughout late 1972 and 1973. In September 1972, the 40
Committee authorized $24,000 for "emergency support" of a powerful businessmen's
organization, but decided against financial support to other private sector
organizations because of their possible involvement in anti-government strikes.
In October 1972, the Committee approved $100,000 for three private sector
organizations -the businessmen's organization, associations of large and small
businessmen and an umbrella organization of opposition groups- as part of a $1.5
million approval for support to opposition groups. According to ~ CIA testimony,
this limited financial support to the private sector was confined to specific
activities in support of the opposition electoral campaign, such as voter
registration drives and a get-out-the-vote campaign.
After the March 1973 elections, in which opposition forces failed to achieve
the two thirds majority in the Senate that might have permitted them to impeach
Allende and hold new elections, the U.S. Government re-assessed its objectives.
There seemed little likelihood of a successful military coup, but there did
appear to be a possibility that increasing unrest in the entire country might
induce the military to re-enter the Allende government in order to restore
order. Various proposals for supporting private sector groups were examined in
the context, but the Ambassador and the Department of State remained opposed to
any such support because of the increasingly high level of tension in Chile, and
because the groups were known to hope for military intervention.
Nevertheless, on August 20, the 40 Committee approved a proposal granting $1
million to opposition parties and private sector groups, with passage of the
funds contingent on the concurrence of the Ambassador, Nathaniel Davis, and the
Department of State. None of these funds were passed to private sector groups
before the military coup three weeks later.
While these deliberations were taking place, the CIA Station asked
Headquarters to take soundings to determine whether maximum support could he
provided to the opposition, including groups like the truck owners. The
Ambassador agreed that these soundings should be taken, but opposed a specific
proposal for $25,000, of support to the strikers. There was a CIA recommendation
for support to the truck
31
owners, but it is unclear whether or not that proposal came before the 40
Committee. On August 25 -16 days before the coup- Headquarters advised the
Station that soundings were being taken, but the CIA Station's proposal was
never approved.
The pattern of U.S. deliberations suggests a careful distinction between
supporting the opposition parties and funding private sector groups trying to
bring about a military coup. However, given turbulent conditions in Chile, the
interconnections among the CIA-sup- ported political parties, the various
militant trade associations (gremios) and paramilitary groups prone to
terrorism and violent disruption were many. The CIA was aware that links between
these groups and the political parties made clear distinctions difficult.
The most prominent of the right-wing paramilitary groups was Patria y
Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty), which formed following Allende's
September 4 election, during so-called Track II. The CIA provided Patria y
Libertad with $38,000 through a third party during the Track II period, in
an effort to create tension and a possible pretext for intervention by the
Chilean military. After Allende took office, the CIA occasionally provided the
group small sums through third parties for demonstrations or specific propaganda
activity. Those disbursements, about seven thousand dollars in total, ended in
1971. It is possible that CIA funds given to political parties reached Patria
y Libertad and a similar group, the Rolando Matus Brigade, given the close
ties between the parties and these organizations.
Throughout the Allende presidency, Patria y Libertad was the most
strident voice opposing all compromise efforts by Christian Democrats, calling
for resistance to government measures, and urging insurrection in the armed
forces. Its tactics came to parallel those of the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR) at the opposite end of the political spectrum. Patria y Libertad
forces marched at opposition rallies dressed in full riot gear. During the
October 1972 national truckers' strike, Patria y Libertad was reported to
strew "miguelitos" (three-pronged steel tacks) on highways in order to help
bring the country's transportation system to a halt. On July 13, 1973, Patria
y Libertad placed a statement in a Santiago newspaper claiming
responsibility for an abortive coup on June 29, and on July 17, Patria y
Libertad leader Roberto Thieme announced that his groups would unleash a
total armed offensive to overthrow the government.
With regard to the truckers' strike, two facts are undisputed. First, the 40
Committee did not approve any funds to be given directly to the strikers.
Second, all observers agree that the two lengthy strikes (the second lasted from
July 13, 1973 until the September 11 coup) could not have been maintained on the
basis of union funds, It remains unclear whether or to what extent CIA funds
passed to opposition parties may have been siphoned off to support strikes. It
is clear that anti-government strikers were actively supported by several of the
private sector groups which received CIA funds. There were extensive links
between these private sector organizations and the groups which coordinated and
implemented the strikes. In November 1972 the CIA learned that one private
sector group had passed $2,800 directly to strikers, contrary to the Agency's
ground rules. The CIA rebuked the group but nevertheless passed it
additional money the next month.
3. United States Economic Policies Toward
Chile: 1970-1973
A. Covert Action and Economic Pressure
The policy response of the U. S. Government to the Allende regime
consistedof an interweaving of diplomatic, covert, military, and
economic strands.Economic pressure exerted by the United States formed
an important part ofthe mix. It is impossible to understand the effect
of covert action withoutknowing the economic pressure which accompanied
it. B. Chilean Economic Dependence
The demise of the brief Allende experiment in 1970-73 came as the cumulative
result of many factors -external and internal. The academic debate as to whether
the external or the internal factors weighed more heavily is endless. This is
not the place to repeat it. A brief description of the Chilean economy will
suffice to suggest the probable effect on Chile of U.S. economic actions and the
possible interactions between economic and political factors in causing
Allende's downfall.
Chile's export-oriented economy remained, in 1970, dependent for foreign
exchange earnings on a single product -copper- much as it had depended on
nitrate in the 19th century. However, the Allende Administration consciously
adopted a policy of beginning to diversify Chile's trade by expanding ties with
Great Britain, the rest of the Western European countries, and Japan, and by
initiating minor trade agreements with the Eastern Bloc countries.
Nevertheless, Chilean economic dependence on the United States remained a
significant factor during the period of the Allende government. In 1970, U.S.
direct private investment in Chile stood at $1.1 billion, out of an estimated
total foreign investment of $1.672 billion. U.S. and foreign corporations played
a large part in almost all of the critical areas of the Chilean economy.
Furthermore, United States corporations controlled the production of 80 percent
of Chile's copper, which in 1970 accounted for four-fifths of Chile's foreign
exchange earnings. Hence, the Allende government faced a situation in which
decisions of foreign corporations had significant ramifications throughout the
Chilean economy.
Chile had accumulated a large foreign debt during the Frei government, much
of it contracted with international and private banks. Chile was able, through
the Paris Club, to re-negotiate $800 million in debts to foreign governments and
medium-term debt to major U.S. banks in early 1972. It also obtained in 1972
some $600 million in credits and loans from socialist bloc countries and Western
sources; however, a study done by the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance
for Progress, concluded that these credits were "tied to specific development
projects and [could] be used only gradually".
Even with a conscious policy of diversifying its foreign trading patterns, in
1970 Chile continued to depend on the import of essential replacement parts from
United States firms. The availability of short-term United States commercial
credits dropped from around $300 million during the Frei years to around $30
million in 1972. The drop, a result of combined economic and political factors,
seriously affected the Allende government's ability to purchase replacement
parts and machinery for the most critical sectors of the economy: copper, steel,
electricity, petroleum, and transport.
(32)
By late 1972, the Chilean Ministry of the Economy estimated that almost
one-third of the diesel trucks at Chuquicamata Copper Mine, 30 percent of the
privately owned city buses, 21 percent of all taxis, and 33 percent of
state-owned buses in Chile could not operate because of the lack of spare parts
or tires. In overall terms, the value of United States machinery and transport
equipment exported to Chile by U.S. firms declined from $152.6 million in 1970
to $110 million in 1971.
C. The Instruments of United States Foreign Economic PolicyToward
Allende.
United States foreign economic policy toward Allende's government was
articulated at the highest levels of the U.S. government, and coordinated by
interagency task forces. The policy was clearly framed during the Track II
period. Richard Helm's notes from his September 15, 1970, meeting with President
Nixon, the meeting which initiated Track II, contain the indication: "Make the
economy scream". A week later Ambassador Korry reported telling Frei, through
his Defense Minister, that "not a nut or bolt would be allowed to reach Chile
under Allende".
While the Chilean economy was vulnerable to U.S. pressures over a period of a
few years, it was not in the short run. That judgment was clearly made by
intelligence analysts in the government, but its implications seem not to have
affected policy-making in September and October of 1970. A February 1971
Intelligence Memorandum noted that Chile was not immediately vulnerable to
investment, trade or monetary sanctions imposed by the United States. In fact,
the imposition of sanctions, while it would hurt Chile eventually, was seen to
carry one possible short-run benefit -it would have given Chile a justification
for renouncing nearly a billion dollars debt to the United States.
The policy of economic pressure -articulated in NSDM 93 of November 1970- was
to be implemented through several means. All new bilateral foreign assistance
was to be stopped, although disbursements would continue under loans made
previously. The U.S. would use its predominant position in international
financial institutions to dry up the flow of new multilateral credit or other
financial assistance. To the extent possible, financial assistance or guarantees
to U.S. private investment in Chile would be ended, and U.S. businesses would be
made aware of the government's concern and its restrictive policies.
The bare figures tell the story. U.S. bilateral aid, $35 million in 1969, was
$1.5 million in 1971. (See Table II.) U.S. Export-Import Bank credits, which had
totaled $234 million in 1967 and $29 million in 1969, dropped to zero in 1971.
Loans from the multilateral Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), in which the
U.S. held what amounted to a veto, had totaled $46 million in 1970; they fell to
$2 million in 1972 (United States A.I.D. figures). The only new IDB loans made
to Chile during the Allende period were two small loans to Chilean universities
made in January 1971 (4). Similarly, the World Bank made no new loans to Chile
between 1970 and 1973. However, the International Monetary Fund extended Chile
approximately $90 million during 1971 and 1972 to assist with foreign exchange
difficulties.
------------
(4) As with bilateral aid, disbursements were continued under previous
commitments. $54 million was disbursed between December 1970 and December
1972.(IDB figures)
(33)
TABLE II.- Foreign Aid to Chile from U.S. government
agencies and International Institutions.-Total of loans and grants (in millions
of dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ Fiscal year
1953-61 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
------------------------------------------------------------------------ Total U.S. economic aid 339.7
169.8 85.3 127.1 130.4 111.9 260.4 U.S.
Aid 76.4 142.7 41.3
78.9 99.5 93.2 15.5 U.S. Food for
Peace 94.2 6.6 22.0 26.9 14.2
14.4 7.9 U.S. Export-Import
Bank 169.0 0.8 16.2 15.3 8.2 0.1
234.6 Total U.S. Military
aid 41.8 17.8 30.6 9.0 9.9
10.1 4.1 Total U.S. economic and military
aid 381.5 187.6 115.9 136.1 140.3 122.0 264.5 Total international organizations(3) 135.4 18.7 31.2
41.4 12.4 72.0 93.8 IBRD (World
Bank) 95.2 ------------ 22.6
4.4 2.7 60.0 Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB)
5.7 15.1 24.4 16.6 4.9 62.2 31.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1968
1969 1970 1971 1972 1974 1974 Total
U.S. economic aid 97.1 80.8 29.6 8.6
7.4 3.8 9.8 U.S.
Aid 57.9 35.5 18.0
1.5 1.0 0.8 5.3 U.S. Food
for Peace 23.0 15.0 7.2 6.3
5.9 2.5 3.2 U.S. Export-Import
Bank 14.2 28.7 3.3 ---- 1.6 3.1
98.1(1) Total U.S. Military
aid 7.8 11.8 0.8 5.7 12.3
15.0 15.9 Total U.S. economic and military
aid 104.9 91.8 30.4 14.3
21.3(2)21.9(2)123.8(2) Total international
organizations(3) 19.4 49.0 76.4 15.4 8.2(2) 9.4
111.2 IBRD (World
Bank) ----- 11.6 19.3 ----
---- ---- 13.5 Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB)
16.5 31.9 45.6 12.0 2.1 5.2 97.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (1) Includes Ex-Im: 57.0 and other: 41.1. (2) Total per chart plus Export-Import Bank. (3) U.S. contributions to I.O's included above; therefore U.S. aid and
international aid should not be added together. Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan
Authorizations, July 1, 1945 to June 30, 1974, pp. 39, 175. Prepared by
Statistics and Reports Division, Office of Financial Management, Agency for
International Development
(34)
Reactions to events in Chile accounted for much of the momentum in the United
States Government for the development of a policy on expropriation. In what came
to be known as the Allende Doctrine, Chile proposed to deduct a calculation of
"excess profits" (over and above reinvestments and a 10-12 percent profit
margin) from any compensation paid to nationalized firms in the copper sector.
By this calculations, U.S. copper companies were in fact told they owed money.
The reaction of the U.S. Government was strong. In January 1972, President Nixon
announced that, when confronted with such situations, the U.S. would cut off
bilateral aid and "withhold its support from loans under consideration in
multilateral development banks."
While the State Department, the CIA, and the Department of Commerce all
participated in the United States economic policy toward Chile, a central point
in the execution of this policy was the Department of the Treasury. The
Department instructs U.S. representatives on multilateral lending institutions.
In the IDB, for instance, the U.S. controlled 40 percent of the votes,
sufficient to veto any "soft" IDB loans. Loan proposals submitted to the IDB
were held under study, never coming up for a vote by the IDB Board. Whether U.S.
actions, and those of multilateral institutions, were motivated by political
interests or economic judgments of Chile's "credit worthiness" is a debate not
yet definitely settled. However, it seems clear from the pattern of U.S.
economic actions and from the nature of debates within the Executive Branch that
American economic policy was driven more by political opposition to an Allende
regime than by purely technical judgments about Chile's finances.
The posture of the Export-Import Bank, a United States public institution,
reflected the tone of U.S. economic policy toward Chile during the Allende
period. In the fall of 1970, the Bank dropped Chile's credit rating from "B",
the second category, to "D", the last category. Insofar as the rating
contributed to similar evaluations by private U.S. banks, corporations, and
international private investors, it aggravated Chile's problem of attracting and
retaining needed capital inflow through private foreign investment. In
mid-August 1971 the Bank decided that a $21 million credit for Boeing passenger
jets would be deferred pending a resolution of the controversy over compensation
for nationalized U.S. copper companies. That Bank decision came one month after
the nationalization and two months before the final decision on compensation. In
fact, the Boeing decision had been first announced in May, BEFORE the
nationalization occurred.
The United States linked the question of indemnization for U.S. copper
companies with Chile's multilateral foreign debt. That foreign debt, an
inheritance from the obligations incurred by the Alessandri and Frei
governments, was the second highest foreign debt per capita of any country in
the world. Yet, in the 1972 and 1973 Paris Club foreign debt negotiations with
Chile's principal foreign creditor nations, the United States alone refused to
consider rescheduling Chile's foreign payments until there was movement toward
indemnization for the U.S. copper companies. The United States also exerted
pressure on each of the other foreign creditor nations not to renegotiate
Chile's foreign debt as a group. (35)
As part of its attempt to induce the Chilean military to intervene before the
October 24 congressional vote, the United States had threatened to cut off
military aid if the military refused to act. That was accompanied by a promise
of support in the aftermath of a coup. However, military assistance was not cut
off at the time of Allende's confirmation (see Table III). Military sales jumped
sharply from 1972 to 1973 and even more sharply from 1973 to 1974 after the coup
(see Table IV). Training of Chilean military personnel in Panama also rose
during the Allende years (see Table V)
C. 1970-1973
After the failure of Track II, the CIA rebuilt its network of
contacts and remained close to Chilean military officers in order to monitor
developments within the armed forces. For their part, Chilean officers who were
aware that the United States once had sought a coup to prevent Allende from
becoming president must have been sensitive to indications of continuing U.S.
support for a coup.
By September 1971 a new network of agents was in place and the Station was
receiving almost daily reports of new coup plotting. The Station and
Headquarters began to explore ways to use this network. At the same time, and in
parallel, the Station and Headquarters discussed a "deception operation"
designed to alert Chilean officers to real or purported Cuban involvement in the
Chilean army. Throughout the fall of 1971 the Station and Headquarters carried
on a dialogue about both the general question of what to do with the
intelligence network and the objectives of the specific operation.
TABLE III.-MILITARY ASSISTANCE 1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fiscal
year Programmed
Delivered --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1966
$8,806,000
$8,306,000 1967
4,143,000
4,766,000 1968
1,801,000
7,507,000 1969
734,000
2,662,000 1970
852,000
1,966,000 1971
698,000
1,033,000 1972
870,000
2,227,000 1973
941,000
918,000 1974
912,000
619,000 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Figures are from a Department of Defense response to a Senate Select Committee
document request and are unclassified.
TABLE IV.-MILITARY SALES 1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fiscal
year Orders
Delivered ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1966
$1,057,000
$1,410,600 1967
2,559,000
1,690,080 1968
4,077,000
2,100,000 1969
1,676,000
2,147,000 1970
7,503,000
9,145,060 1971
2,806,000
2,958,000 1972
6,238,000
4,583,000 1973
14,972,000
2,242,000 1974
76,120,000
4,860,080 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Figures are from a Department of Defense response to a Senate Select
Committee document request and are unclassified.
38
TABLE V.- TRAINING IN PANAMA1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Fiscal
year Number of Fiscal year
Number of
people
people ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1966
68 1971
146 1967 57
1972
197 1961 169
1973
257 1969 167
1974
266 1970
161 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Figures are from a Department of Defense response to a Senate Select Committee
document request and are unclassified.
The Station proposed, in September, to provide information -some of it
fabricated by the CIA- which would convince senior Chilean Army officers that
the Carabineros' Investigations unit, with the approval of Allende was
acting in concert with Cuban intelligence (DGI) to gather intelligence
prejudicial to the Army high command. It was hoped that the extort would arouse
the military against Allende's involvement with the Cubans, inducing the armed
services to press the government to alter its orientation and to move against it
if necessary. A month later CIA Headquarters suggested that the deception
operation be shelved, in favor of passing "verifiable" information to the leader
of the coup group which Headquarters and the Station perceived as having the
highest probability of success.
After a further Station request, Headquarters agreed to the operation with
the objective of educating senior Chilean officers and keeping them on alert. In
December 1971 a packet of material, including a fabricated letter, was passed to
a Chilean officer outside Chile. The CIA did not receive any subsequent reports
on the effect if any, this "information" had on the Chilean military. While the
initial conception of the operation had included a series of such passages, no
further packets were passed.
The Station/Headquarters dialogue over the use of the intelligence network
paralleled the discussion of the deception operation. In November the Station
suggested that the ultimate objective of the military penetration program was a
military coup. Headquarters responded by rejecting that formulation of the
objective, cautioning that the CIA did not have 40 Committee approval to become
involved in a coup. However, Headquarters acknowledged the difficulty of drawing
a firm line between monitoring coup plotting and becoming involved in it. It
also realized that the U.S. government's desire to be in clandestine contract
with military plotters, for whatever purpose, might well imply to them U.S.
support for their future plans.
During I970-73, the Station collected operational intelligence necessary in
the event of a coup -arrest lists, key civilian installations and personnel that
needed protection, key government installations which need to be taken over, and
government contingency plans which would be used in case of a military uprising.
According to the CIA the data was collected only against the contingency of
future Headquarters requests and was never passed to the Chilean military.
The intelligence network continued to report throughout 1972 and 1973 on coup
plotting activities. During 1972 the Station continued to monitor the group
which might mount a successful coup, and it spent a significantly greater amount
of time and effort penetrating this
39
group than it had on previous groups. This group had originally come to the
Station's attention in October 1971. By January 1972 the Station had
successfully penetrated it and was in contact through an intermediary with its
leader.
During late 1971 and early 1972, the CIA adopted a more active stance vis
a vis its military penetration program, including a short-lived effort to
subsidize a small anti-government news pamphlet directed at the armed services,
its compilation of arrest lists and other operational data, and its deception
operation.
Intelligence reporting on coup plotting reached two peak periods, one in the
last week of June 1973 and the other during the end of August and the first two
weeks in September. It is clear the CIA received intelligence reports on the
coup planning of the group which carried out the successful September 11 coup
throughout the months of July, August, and September 1973.
The CIA's information-gathering efforts with regard to the Chilean military
included activity which went beyond the mere collection of information. More
generally, those efforts must be viewed in the context of United States
opposition, overt and covert, to the Allende government. They put the United
States Government in contact with those Chileans who sought a military
alternative to the Allende presidency.
F. Post-1973 1. Chile Since the Coup
Following the September 11, 1973, coup, the military Junta, led by General
Augusto Pinochet, moved quickly to consolidate its newly acquired power.
Political parties were banned, Congress was put in indefinite recess, press
censorship was instituted, supporters of Allende and others deemed opponents of
the new regime were jailed, and elections were put off indefinitely.
The prospects for the revival of democracy in Chile have improved little over
the last two years. A 1975 National Intelligence Estimate stated that the
Chilean armed forces were determined to oversee a prolonged political moratorium
and to revamp the Chilean political system. The NIE stated that the Junta had
established tight, authoritarian controls over political life in Chile which
generally continued in effect. It had outlawed Marxist parties in Chile as well
as other parties which had comprised Allende's coalition. In addition, the
Christian Democratic and National parties had been placed in involuntary recess.
These two parties were forbidden from engaging in political activity and
restricted to purely housekeeping functions.
In addition, charges concerning the violation of human rights in Chile
continue to be directed at the Junta. Most recently, a United Nations report on
Chile charged that "torture centers" are being operated in Santiago and other
parts of the country. The lengthy document, issued October 14, 1975, listed 11
centers where it says prisoners are being questioned "by methods amounting to
torture." The Pinochet government had originally offered full cooperation to the
U.N. group, including complete freedom of movement in Chile. However, six days
before the group's arrival in Santiago the government reversed itself and
notified the group that the visit was cancelled.
40
2. CIA Post-coup Activities in Chile
The covert action budget for Chile was cut back sharply after the coup and
all the anti-Allende projects except for one, a major propaganda project, were
terminated. Covert activities in Chile following the coup were either
continuations or adaptations of earlier projects, rather than major new
initiatives.
The goal of covert action immediately following the coup was to assist the
Junta in gaining a more positive image, both at home and abroad, and to maintain
access to the command levels of the Chilean government. Another goal, achieved
in part through work done at the opposition research organization before the
coup, was to help the new government organize and implement new policies.
Project files record that. CIA collaborators were involved in preparing an
initial overall economic plan which has served as the basis for the Junta's most
important economic decisions.
With regard to the continuing propaganda project, a number of activities,
including the production of books, a mailing effort, a military collection
program, and the media coordination effort were terminated. However, access to
certain Chilean media outlets was retained in order to enable the CIA Station in
Santiago to help build Chilean public support for the new government as well as
to influence the direction of the government, through pressures exerted by the
mass media. These media outlets attempted to present the Junta in the most
positive light for the Chilean public and to assist foreign journalists in Chile
to obtain facts about the local situation. Further, two CIA collaborators
assisted the Junta in preparing a White Book of the Change of Government in
Chile. The White Book published by the Junta shortly after the coup,
was written to justify the overthrow of Allende. It was distributed widely both
in Washington and in other foreign capitals.
After the coup, the CIA renewed liaison relations with the Chilean
government's security and intelligence forces, relations which had been
disrupted during the Allende period. Concern was expressed within the CIA that
liaison with such organizations would lay the Agency open to charges of aiding
political repression; officials acknowledged that, while most of CIA's support
to the various Chilean forces would be designed to assist them in controlling
subversion from abroad, the support could be adaptable to the control of
internal subversion as well. However, the CIA made it clear to the Chileans at
the outset that no CIA support would be provided for use in internal political
repression. Furthermore, the CIA attempted to influence the Junta to maintain
the norms the Junta had set in its "Instructions for Handling of Detainees"
which closely followed the standards on human rights set by the 1949 Geneva
Convention.
41
IV. CHILE: AUTHORIZATION, ASSESSMENT, AND OVERSIGHT
A. 40 Committee Authorization and Control: Chile, 1969-1973
1. 40 Committee Functions and Procedures
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (42)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (43)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (44)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (45)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (46)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (47)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (48)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (49)
------------------------------------------------------------------------ (50)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Preliminary Conclusions
Underlying all discussion of American interference in the internal affairs of
Chile is the basic question of why the United States initially mounted such an
extensive covert action program in Chile -and why it continued, and even
expanded, in the early 1970s.
Covert action has been a key element of U.S. foreign policy toward Chile. The
link between covert action and foreign policy was obvious throughout the decade
between 1964 and 1974. In 1964, the United States commitment to democratic
reform via the Alliance for Progress and overt foreign aid was buttressed via
covert support for the election of the candidate of the Christian Democratic
party, a candidate and a party for which the Alliance seemed tailor made. During
1970 the U.S. Government tried, covertly, to prevent Allende from becoming
President of Chile. When that failed, covert support to his opposition formed
one of a triad of official actions: covert aid to opposition forces, "cool but
correct" diplomatic posture, and economic pressure. From support of what the
United States considered to be democratic and progressive forces in Chile we had
moved finally to advocating and encouraging the overthrow of a democratically
elected government.
A. Covert Action and U.S. Foreign Policy
In 1964, the United States became massively involved in covert activity in
Chile. This involvement was seen by U.S. policy-makers as consistent with
overall American foreign policy and the goals of the Alliance for Progress. The
election of a moderate left candidate in Chile was a cornerstone of U.S. policy
toward Latin America.
It is unclear from the record whether the 1964 election project was intended
to be a one-time intervention in support of a good cause. It is clear that the
scale of the involvement generated commitments and expectations on both sides.
For the United States, it created assets and channels of funding which could be
used again. For the Chilean groups receiving CIA funds, that funding became an
expectation, counted upon. Thus, when opposition to Allende became the primary
objective of covert action in 1970, the structure for covert action developed
through covert assistance to political parties in 1964 was well established.
A fundamental question raised by the pattern of U.S. covert activities
persist: DID THE THREAT TO VITAL U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS POSED BY THE
PRESIDENCY OF SALVADOR ALLENDE JUSTIFY THE SEVERAL MAJOR COVERT ATTEMPTS TO
PREVENT HIS ACCESSION TO POWER? Three American Presidents and their senior
advisors evidently thought so.
One rationale for covert intervention in Chilean politics was spelled out by
Henry Kissinger in his background briefing to the press on September 16, 1970,
the day after Nixon's meeting with Helms. He argued that an Allende victory
would be irreversible within Chile, might affect neighboring nations and would
pose "massive problems" for the U.S. in Latin America:
(51)
I have yet to meet somebody who firmly believes that if Allende
wins, there is likely to be another free election in Chile... Now it is fairly
easy for one to predict that if Allende wins, there is a good chance that he
will establish over a period of years some sort of communist government. In that
case, we would have one not on an island off the coast (Cuba) which has not a
traditional relationship and impact on Latin America, but in a major Latin
American country you would have a communist government, joining, for example,
Argentine... Peru... and Bolivia... So I don't think we should delude ourselves
on an Allende takeover and Chile would not present massive problems for us, and
for democratic forces and for pro-U.S. forces in Latin America, and indeed to
the whole Western Hemisphere.
Another rationale for U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of Chile was
offered by a high-ranking official who testified before the Committee. He spoke
of Chile's position in a worldwide strategic chess game in 1970. In this
analogy, Portugal might be a bishop, Chile a couple of pawns, perhaps more. In
the worldwide strategic chess game, one a position was lost, a series of
consequences followed. U.S. enemies would proceed to exploit the new
opportunity, and our ability to cope with the challenge would be limited by any
American loss.
B. Executive Command and Control of Major Covert Action
In pursuing the Chilean chess game, particularly the efforts to prevent
Allende's accession to power or his maintaining power once elected, Executive
command and control of major covert action was tight and well directed.
Procedures within the CIA for controlling the programs were well defined and the
procedures made Station officials accountable to their supervisors in
Washington. Unilateral actions on the part of the Station were virtually
impossible.
But the central issue of command and control is ACCOUNTABILITY: procedures
for insuring that covert actions are and remain accountable both to the senior
political and foreign policy officials of the Executive Branch and to the
Congress.
The record of covert activities in Chile suggests that, although established
executive processes of authorization and control were generally adhered to,
there were - and remain - genuine shortcomings to these processes:
Decisions about WHICH covert action projects are submitted to the 40
Committee were and are made within the CIA on the basis of the Agency's
determination of the political sensitivity of a project.
The form in which covert action projects were cleared with Ambassadors and
other State Department officials varied. It depended -and still depends- on how
interested Ambassadors are and how forthcoming their Station Chiefs are.
Once major projects are approved by the 40 Committee, they often continue
without searching re-examination by the Committee. The Agency conducts annual
reviews of on-going projects, but the 40 Committee does not undertake a review
unless a project is recommended for renewal, or there is some important change
in content or amount. There is also the problem of controlling clandestine
projects not labeled "covert action". Clandestine collection of human
intelligence
(52)
is NOT the subject of 40 Committee review. But those projects may be just as
politically sensitive as a "covert action"; witness U.S. contacts with the
Chilean military during 1970-73. Similarly, for security reasons, ambassadors
generally know CIA assets only by general description, not by name. That
practice may be acceptable, provided the description is detailed enough to
inform the ambassador of the risk posed by the development of a particular asset
and to allow the ambassador to decide whether or not that asset should be used.
There remains the question of the dangers which arise when the very
mechanisms established by the Executive Branch for insuring internal
accountability are circumvented or frustrated.
By Presidential instruction, Track II was to be operated without informing
the U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, the State Department, or any 40 Committee
member save Henry Kissinger. The President and his senior advisors thus denied
themselves the Government's major sources of counsel about Chilean politics. And
the Ambassador in Santiago was left in the position of having to deal with any
adverse political spill-over from a project of which he was not informed.
The danger was greater still. Whatever the truth about communication between
the CIA and the White House after October 15, 1970 -an issue which is the
subject of conflicting testimony- all participants agreed that Track II
constituted a broad mandate to the CIA. The Agency was given to believe it had
virtual CARTE BLANCHE authority; moreover, it felt under extreme pressure to
prevent Allende from coming to power, by military coup if necessary. It was
given little guidance about what subsequent clearances it needed to obtain from
the White House. Under these conditions, CIA consultation with the White House
in advance of specific actions was less than meticulous.
C. The Role of the Congress
In the hands of Congress rests the responsibility for insuring that the
Executive Branch is held to full political accountability for covert activities.
The record on Chile is mixed and muted by its incompleteness.
CIA records note a number of briefings of Congressional committees about
covert action in Chile. Those records, however, do not reveal the timeliness or
the level of detail of these briefings. Indeed, the record suggests that the
briefings were often after the fact and incomplete. The situation improved after
1973, apparently as Congressional committees became more persistent in the
exercise of their oversight function. Furthermore, Sec. 662 of the Foreign
Assistance Act should make it impossible for major projects to be operated
without the appropriate Congressional committees being informed.
The record leaves unanswered a number of questions. These pertain both to how
forthcoming the Agency was and how interested and persistent the Congressional
committees were. Were members of Congress, for instance, given the opportunity
to object to specific projects before the projects were implemented? Did they
want to? There is also an issue of jurisdiction. CIA and State Department
officials have taken the position that they are authorized to reveal Agency
operations only to the appropriate oversight committees.
(53)
D. Intelligence Judgments and Covert Operations
A review of the intelligence judgments on Chile offered by U.S. analysts
during the critical period from 1970-1973 has NOT established whether these
judgments were taken into account when U.S. policy-makers formulated and
approved U.S. covert operations. This examination of the relevant intelligence
estimates and memoranda has established that the judgments of the analysts
suggested caution and restraint while the political imperatives demanded action.
Even within the Central Intelligence Agency, processes for bringing
considered judgments of intelligence analysts to bear on proposed covert actions
were haphazard -and generally ineffective. This situation has improved; covert
action proposals now regularly come before the Deputy Director for Intelligence
and the appropriate National Intelligence Officer; but the operators still are
separated from the intelligence analysts, those whose exclusive business it is
to understand and predict foreign politics. For instance, the analysts who
drafted the government's most prestigious intelligence analyses -Niles- may not
even have known of U.S. covert actions in Chile.
The Chilean experience does suggest that the Committee give serious
consideration to the possibility that lodging the responsibility for national
estimates AND conduct of operational activities with the same person -the
Director of Central Intelligence- creates an inherent conflict of interest and
judgment.
F. Effects of Major Covert Action Programs
Covert Action programs as costly and as complex as several mounted by the
United States in Chile are unlikely to remain covert. In Chile in 1964, there
was simply too much unexplained money, too many leaflets, too many broadcasts.
That the United States was involved in the election has been taken for granted
in Latin America for many years.
The involvement in 1964 created a presumption in Chile and elsewhere in Latin
America that the United States Government would again be involved in 1970. This
made secrecy still harder to maintain, even though the CIA involvement was much
smaller in 1970 than it had been in 1964.
When covert actions in Chile became public knowledge, the costs were obvious.
The United States was seen, by its covert actions, to have contradicted not only
its official declarations but its treaty commitments and principles of long
standing. At the same time it was proclaiming a "low profile" in Latin American
relations, the U.S. Government was seeking to foment a coup in Chile.
The costs of major covert ventures which are "blown" are clear enough. But
there may be costs to pay even if the operations could remain secret for long
periods of time. Some of these costs may accrue even within the calculus of
covert operations: successes may turn to failures. Several officials from whom
the Committee took testimony suggested that the poor showing of the Chilean
Christian Democrats in 1970 was, in some part, attributable to previous American
covert support. Of course there were many causes of that poor showing, but in
1964 the PDC had been spared the need of developing
(54)
some of its own grass roots organizations. The CIA did much of that for it.
In 1970, with less CIA activity on behalf of the Christian Democratic Party, the
PDC faltered.
Of course, the more important costs, even of covert actions which remain
secret, are those to American ideals of relations among nations and of
constitutional government. In the case of Chile, some of those costs were far
from abstract: witness the involvement of United States military officers in the
Track II attempt to overthrow a constitutionally-elected civilian government.
There are also long-term effects of covert actions. Many of those may be
adverse. They touch American as well as foreign institutions. The Chilean
institutions that the United States most favored may have been discredited
within their own societies by the fact of their covert support. In Latin America
particularly, even the suspicion of CIA support may be the kiss of death. It
would be the final irony of a decade of covert action in Chile if that action
destroyed the credibility of the Chilean Christian Democrats.
The effects on American institutions are less obvious but no less important.
U.S. private and governmental institutions with overt, legitimate purposes of
their own may have been discredited by the pervasiveness of covert action. Even
if particular institutions were not involved in covert action, they may have
been corrupted in the perception of Latin Americans because of the pervasiveness
of clandestine U.S. activity.
In the end, the whole of U.S. policy making may be affected. The availability
of an "extra" means may alter officials' assessment of the costs and rationales
of overt policies. It may postpone the day when outmoded policies are abandoned
and new ones adopted. Arguably, the 1964 election project was part of a
"progressive" approach to Chile. The project was justified, if perhaps not
actually sustained, by the desire to elect democratic reformers. By 1970, covert
action had become completely defensive in character: to prevent the election of
Allende. The United States professed a "low profile" but at the same time acted
covertly to ensure that the Chilean elections came out right, "low profile"
notwithstanding.
A special case for concern is the relationship between intelligence agencies
and multinational corporations.
In 1970, U.S. Government policy prohibited covert CIA support to a single
party or candidate. At the same time, the CIA provided advice to an
American-based multinational corporation on how to furnish just such direct
support. That raised all of the dangers of exposure, and eliminated many of the
safeguards and controls normally present in exclusively CIA covert operations.
There was the appearance of an improperly close relationship between the CIA and
multinational companies when former Director John McCone used contacts and
information gained while at the CIA to advise a corporation on whose Board of
Directors he sat. This appearance was heightened because the contacts between
the Agency and the corporation in 1970 extended to discussing and even planning
corporate intervention in the Chilean electoral process.
The problem of cooperation is exacerbated when a cooperating company -such as
ITT- is called to give testimony before an appropriate Congressional Committee.
The Agency may then be confronted with
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the question of whether to come forward to set the record straight when it
believes that testimony given on behalf of a cooperating company is untrue. The
situation is difficult, for in coming forward the Agency may reveal sensitive
sources and methods by which it learned the facts or may make public the
existence of ongoing covert operations.
This report does no attempt to offer a final judgment on the political
propriety, the morality, or even the effectiveness of American covert activity
in Chile. Did the threat posed by an Allende presidency justify covert American
involvement in Chile? Did it justify the specific and unusual attempt to foment
a military coup to deny Allende the presidency? In 1970, the U.S. sought to
foster a military coup in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to power; yet
after 1970 the government -according to the testimony of its officials- did not
engage in coup plotting. Was 1970 a mistake, an aberration? Or was the threat
posed to the national security interests of the United States so grave that the
government was remiss in not seeking his downfall directly during 1970-73? What
responsibility does the United States bear for the cruelty and political
suppression that have become the hallmark of the present regime in Chile?
On these questions Committee members may differ. So may American citizens.
Yet the Committee's mandate is less to judge the past than to recommend for the
future. Moving from past cases to future guidelines, what is important to note
is that covert action has been perceived as middle ground between diplomatic
representation and the overt use of military force. In the case of Chile, that
middle ground may have been far too broad. Given the costs of covert action, it
should be resorted to only to counter severe threats to the national security of
the United States. It is far from clear that that was the case in Chile.
(56)
Appendix CHRONOLOGY: CHILE 1962-1975 (1) 1962
*Special Group approves $50,000 to strengthen Christian Democratic Party
(PDC); subsequently approves an additional $180,000 to strengthen PDC and its
leader, Eduardo Frei.
1963
*Special Group approves $20,000 for a leader of the Radical Party (PR); later
approves an additional $30,000 to support PR candidates in April municipal
elections.
April 8 Municipal elections results show PDC has replaced PR as Chile's
largest party.
1964
April *Special Group approves $3,000,000 to ensure election of PDC
candidate Eduardo Frei.
May *Special Group approves $160,000 to support PDC slum dwellers and
peasant organizations.
September 4 Eduardo Frei elected President with 55.7 percent of the
vote.
October 2 *Ralph A. Dungan appointed U.S. Ambassador to Chile.
1965
*303 Committee approves $175,000 to assist selected candidates in
Congressional elections.
March 7 PDC wins absolute majority in Chamber of Deputies; becomes largest
party in Senate.
November 15 Salvador Allende, in an interview reported in the New York Times,
suggests the U.S. was among certain "outside forces" that had caused his defeat
in the 1964 presidential election.
1967
June 16 *Edward M. Korry replaces Ralph A. Dungan as U.S. Ambassador to
Chile.
*303 Committee approves $30,000 to strengthen a faction of the Radical
Party.
1968
July 12 *303 Committee approves $350,000 to assist selected candidates in
March 1969 congressional elections.
1969
March 1 Congressional elections reflect an increase in support for the
National Party and a resulting loss in Christian Democratic strength.
April 15 *At a meeting of the 303 Committee the question is raised as to
whether anything should be done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential
election in Chile. The CIA representative pointed out that an election operation
would not be effective unless an early enough start was made.
-------------------------------------------
(1) * indicates U.S. actions throughout
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1969--Continued
October 21 Army units stationed at Tacna, Chile, revolt, ostensibly for the
purposes of dramatizing the military's demand for higher pay. The revolt,
engineered by General Roberto Viaux, is widely interpreted as an abortive coup.
1970
March 25 *40 Committee approves $125,000 for a "spoiling operation" against
Allende's Popular Unity coalition (UP).
June *The possibility of an Allende victory in Chile is raised at an ITT
Board of Directors meeting. John McCone, former CIA Director, and, at the time,
a consultant to the Agency and a Director of ITT, subsequently holds a number of
conversations regarding Chile with Richard Helms, the current CIA Director.
June 27 *40 Committee approves $300,000 for additional anti- Allende
propaganda operations.
July 16 *John McCone arranges for William Broe (CIA) to talk with Harold
Geneen (ITT). Broe tells Geneen that CIA cannot disburse ITT funds but promises
to advise ITT on how to channel its own funds. ITT later passes $350,000 to the
Alessandri campaign through an intermediary.
August 18 *National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 97 is reviewed by the
Interdepartmental Group; the Group considers options ranging from efforts to
forge amicable relations with Allende to opposition to him.
September 4 Salvador Allende wins 36.3 percent of the vote in the
Presidential election. Final outcome is dependent on October 24 vote in Congress
between Allende and the runner-up, Jorge Alessandri, who received 35.3 percent
of the vote. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes out of a total of
3,000,000 votes cast in the election.
September 8, 14 *40 Committee discusses Chilean situation. The Committee
approves $250,000 for the use of Ambassador Korry to influence the October 24
Congressional vote.
September 9 *Harold Geneen, ITT's Chief Executive Officer, tells John McCone
at an ITT Board of Directors meeting in New York that he is prepared to put up
as much as $1 million for the purpose of assisting any government plan designed
to form a coalition in the Chilean Congress to stop Allende. McCone agrees to
communicate this proposal to high Washington officials and meets several days
later with Henry Kissinger and Richard Helms. McCone does not receive a response
from either man.
September 15 *President Nixon instructs CIA Director Helms to prevent
Allende's accession to office. The CIA is to play a direct role in organizing a
military coup d'etat. This involvement comes to be known as Track II.
September 16 *At on off-the-record White House press briefing, Henry
Kissinger warns that the election of Allende would be irreversible, might affect
neighboring nations, and would pose "massive problems" for the U.S. and Latin
America.
September 29 *A CIA official, at the instruction of Richard Helms, meets with
a representative of ITT. The CIA officer proposes a plan to accelerate economic
disorder in Chile. ITT rejects the proposal.
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1970--Continued
October *CIA contacts Chilean military conspirators; following a White House
meeting, CIA attempts to defuse plot by retired General Viaux, but still to
generate maximum pressure to overthrow Allende by coup; CIA provides tear gas
grenades and three submachine guns to conspirators. *ITT submits to White House
an 18-points plan designed to assure that Allende "does not get through the
crucial next six months". The ITT proposal is rejected.
October 14 *40 Committee approves $60,000 for Ambassador Korry's proposal to
purchase a radio station. The money is never spent.
October 22 After two unsuccessful abduction attempts on October 19 and 20, a
third attempt to kidnap Chilean Army General Rene Schneider results in his being
fatally shot.
October 24 The Chilean Congress votes 153 to 35 in favor of Allende over
Alessandri.
November 3 Allende is formally inaugurated President of Chile.
November 13 *40 Committee approves $25,000 for support of Christian
Democratic candidates.
November 19 *40 Committee approves $725,000 for a covert action program in
Chile. Approval is later superseded by January 28, 1971, authorization.
December 21 President Allende proposes a constitutional amendment
establishing state control of the large mines and authorizing expropriation of
all foreign firms working them.
1971
January 28 *40 Committee approves $1,240,000 for the purchase of radio
stations and newspapers and to support municipal candidates and other political
activities of anti- Allende parties.
February 25 *In his annual State of the World message, President Nixon
states, "We are prepared to have the kind of relationship with the Chilean
government that it is prepared to have with us".
March 22 *40 Committee approves $185,000 additional support for the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC).
April 4 Allende's Popular Unity (UP) coalition garners 49.7 percent of the
vote in 280 municipal elections.
May 10 *40 Committee approves $77,000 for purchase of a press for the
Christian Democratic Party newspaper. The press is not obtained and the funds
are used to support the paper.
May 20 *40 Committee approves $100,000 for emergency aid to the Christian
Democratic Party to meet short-term debts.
May 26 *40 Committee approves $150,000 for additional aid to Christian
Democratic Party to meet debts.
July 6 *40 Committee approves $150,000 for support of opposition candidates
in a Chilean by-election.
July 11 In a joint session of the Chilean Congress, a constitutional
amendment is unanimously approved permitting the nationalization of the copper
industry. The amendment provides for compensation to copper companies within 30
years at not less than 3 percent interest.
August 11 *The Export-Import Bank denies a Chilean request for $21 million in
loans and loan guarantees needed to purchase three jets for the national
LAN-Chile airline.
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1971--Continued
September 9 *40 Committee approves $700,000 for support to the major Santiago
newspaper, EL MERCURIO.
September 28 President Allende announces that "excess profits" will be
deducted from compensation to be paid to nationalized copper companies.
September 29 The Chilean government assumes operation of the Chilean
telephone company (CHITELCO). ITT had owned 70 percent interest in the company
since 1930.
September 29 *Nathaniel Davis replaces Edward Korry as U.S. Ambassador to
Chile.
November 5 *40 Committee approves $815,000 support to opposition parties and
to induce a split in the Popular Unity coalition.
December 1 The Christian Democratic and National Parties organize the "March
of the Empty Pots" by women to protest food shortages.
December 15 *40 Committee approves $160,000 to support two opposition
candidates in January 1972 by-elections.
1972
January 19 *President Nixon issues a statement to clarify U.S. policy toward
foreign expropriation of American interests. The President states that the
United States expects compensation to be "prompt, adequate, and effective". The
President warns that should compensation not be reasonable, new bilateral
economic aid to the expropriating country might be terminated and the U.S. would
withhold its support from loans under consideration in multilateral development
banks.
April 11 *40 Committee approves $965,000 for additional support to EL
MERCURIO.
April 24 *40 Committee approves $50,000 for an effort to splinter the Popular
Unity coalition.
May 12 President Allende submits a constitutional amendment to the Chilean
Congress for the expropriation of ITT's holdings in the Chilean telephone
company.
June 16 *40 Committee approves $46,500 to support a candidate in a Chilean
by-election.
August 21 Allende declares a state of emergency in Santiago province after
violence grows out of a one-day strike by most of the capital's shopkeepers.
September 21 *40 Committee approves $24,000 to support an anti- Allende
businessmen's organization.
October 10 The Confederation of Truck Owners calls a nation- wide strike.
October 26 *40 Committee approves $1,427,666 to support opposition political
parties and private sector organizations in anticipation of March 1973
Congressional elections.
December 4 Speaking before the General Assembly of the United Nations,
President Allende charges that Chile has been the "victim of serious aggression"
and adds, "we have felt the effects of a large-scale external pressure against
us".
1973
February 12 *40 Committee approves $200,000 to support opposition political
parties in the Congressional elections.
March 4 In the Congressional elections, Allende's Popular Unity coalition
wins 43.4 percent of the vote.
March 22 Talks between the U.S. and Chile on political and financial problems
end in an impasse.
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1973--Continued
June 5 Chile suspends its foreign shipments of copper as miners' strikes
continue.
June 20 Thousands physicians, teachers, and students go on strike to protest
Allende's handling of the 63-day copper workers' strike.
June 21 Gunfire, bombings, and fighting erupt as government opponents and
supporters carry out a massive strike. The opposition newspaper, EL MERCURIO, is
closed by court order for six days following a government charge that it had
incited subversion. The following day an appeals court invalidates the closure
order.
June 29 Rebel forces seize control of the downtown area of Santiago and
attack the Defense Ministry and the Presidential Palace before troops loyal to
the government surround them and force them to surrender. This is the first
military attempt to overthrow an elected Chilean government in 42 years.
July 26 Truck owners throughout Chile go on strike.
August 2 The owners of more than 110,000 buses and taxis go on strike.
August 20 *40 Committee approves $1 million to support opposition political
parties and private sector organizations. This money is not spent.
August 23 General Carlos Prats Gonzalez resigns as Allende's Defense Minister
and Army Commander. General Pinochet Ugarte is named Army Commander on August
24. Prats' resignation is interpreted as a severe blow to Allende.
August 27 Chile's shop owners call another anti-government strike.
September 4 An estimated 100,000 supporters of Allende's government march in
the streets of Santiago to celebrate the third anniversary of his election. The
Confederation of Professional Employees begins an indefinite works stoppage.
September 11 The Chilean military overthrows the government of Salvador
Allende. Allende dies during the takeover, reportedly by suicide.
September 13 The new military government names Army Commander Pinochet
President and dissolves Congress.
September- October The Junta declares all Marxist political parties October
illegal and places all other parties in indefinite recess. Press censorship is
established, as are detention facilities for opponents of the new regime.
Thousands of casualties are reported, including summary executions.
October 15 *40 Committee approves $34,000 for an anti-Allende radio station
and travel costs of pro-Junta spokesmen.
1974
June 24 *40 Committee approves $50,000 for political commitments made to the
Christian Democratic Party before the coup.
September 16 *President Ford acknowledges covert operations in Chile.
October 25 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the O.A.S.
reports "grievous violations of human rights" in Chile.
December 30 *U.S. military aid is cut off.
1975
June 20 Pinochet declares there "will be no elections in Chile during my
lifetime nor in the lifetime of my successor".
July 4 Chile refuses to allow the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to enter
the country.
October 7 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights reports "with profound disgust"
the use of torture as a matter of policy and other serious violations of human
rights in Chile.
Portions of the above chronology of events in Chile were extracted from
chronologies prepared by the Congressional Research Service ("Chile, 1960-70: A
Chronology"; "Chile Since the Election of Salvador Allende: A Chronology;
"Developments in Chile, March 1973 to the Overthrow of the Allende Government")
and from material contained in the June 21, 1973, report of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations entitled "ITT and Chile".
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